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RE-IMAGINING THE BUSINESS TRUST AS A 
SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS FORM 
LEE-FORD TRITT* & RYAN SCOTT TESCHNER** 
ABSTRACT 
An important policy debate has emerged in the United States concerning 
how business should evolve to encapsulate more fully the burgeoning 
sustainability-conscious management paradigm. At issue in this debate is 
the proper role of business in society. The modern trend in business is to 
consider more than just shareholder profits. In the United States, companies 
are increasingly incorporating sustainability practices into their business 
models. However, by practice and by law, the traditional corporate 
management paradigm—the shareholder primacy model—holds that the 
singular social responsibility of business is to maximize shareholder 
interests, principally shareholder profits. This model conflicts with the 
sustainability management paradigm, which reflects the view that business 
should maximize value for society. Some states have realized the 
shortcomings of the traditional corporate management model and have 
enacted constituency statutes or created new corporate forms to account for 
the growth in sustainable corporate practices. However, these statutes and 
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corporate forms have their own shortcomings. Historically, business trusts 
have been used to circumvent overly-restrictive corporate organizational 
and legal limitations. Entrepreneurs should once again look to this business 
form to pursue sustainable practices while maintaining profitability. Due to 
business trusts’ structure and flexibility, they are an ideal vehicle for 
sustainable businesses. Accordingly, by drawing upon trust law and 
corporate law, this Article articulates an interdisciplinary, systematic 
application of business trusts as an alternative organizational form to 
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INTRODUCTION 
An important policy debate has emerged in the United States concerning 
how business ideology should evolve to encapsulate more fully the 
burgeoning sustainability-conscious management paradigm. At issue in this 
debate is the proper role of business in society. This has led to a heated 
discourse, in the business world, in academia, and in the popular press, 
about corporate sustainability in terms of organizational theory, law, and 
practice. The debate arises from a shift in the business world: companies 
have gone from focusing solely on the bottom line to making a positive 
impact on society. Both big and small businesses are considering their 












environmental, societal, and economic effects on the community rather than 
focusing solely on shareholder wealth maximization. Corporations that 
many view as profit-generating powerhouses, such as Amazon1 and 
Google,2 are incorporating sustainable practices not geared purely towards 
profit.3 However, by practice and by law, the traditional corporate 
management paradigm—the shareholder primacy model—holds that the 
singular social responsibility of business is to maximize shareholder 
interests, principally shareholder profits. This model conflicts with the 
sustainability management paradigm, which reflects the view that business 
should maximize value for society. Regrettably, corporate law and practice 
have remained static, making the corporate form ill-suited for the 
advancement of the sustainable management model. Business trusts and 
trust law, however, may provide a better organizational form and set of rules 
for sustainability-conscious entrepreneurs. Accordingly, by drawing from 
trust law and business law, this Article articulates and advocates an 
interdisciplinary, systematic application of business trusts as an alternative 
organizational form to corporations4 for the socially-conscious business 
construct. 
In the United States, the traditional corporate management paradigm has 
been the shareholder primacy model. The shareholder primacy model 
 
1. On Amazon’s website, it lists one of its sustainability initiatives as expanding its downtown 
Seattle campus. Amazon’s Urban Campus, AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/working-at-amaz 
on/amazons-urban-campus [https://perma.cc/3E2L-A9TP]. It admits that “it would have been cheaper 
to move to the suburbs,” but notes that its employees “love being in the heart of the city.” Id. 
2. Google lists two main sustainability focuses on its website: environment and responsible 
supply chain. Sustainability, GOOGLE, https://sustainability.google [https://perma.cc/NE5B-TBX2] 
[hereinafter Google Sustainability]. In fact, in 2016, Google spent more on renewable energy than any 
other company in the United States, Europe, and Mexico. Umair Irfan, Energy Hog Google Just Bought 
Enough Renewables to Power Its Operations for the Year, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://www.vo 
x.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/6/16734228/google-renewable-energy-wind-solar-2017 [https 
://perma.cc/299Y-VLLE]. 
3. See Lee-ford Tritt & Ryan Scott Teschner, Amazon Delivers Diversity: Geographical & 
Social Influences on Corporate Embeddedness, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Tritt & 
Teschner, Amazon Delivers Diversity]. While on the surface sustainability practices may seem to hurt 
profits, sustainability practices are arguably more profitable in the long-term. Id. at 21.  
4. This Article uses the corporate organizational form solely as a means in which to introduce 
the business trust into the sustainability discourse. Corporations are used for discussion purposes because 
the majority of the larger operating organizations select this form, the majority of publically traded 
companies are corporations, and the Massachusetts business trust originally emerged as an alternative 
to the corporation, specifically the restrictions on what was eligible for a corporate charter. Comparing 
business trusts to corporations and other business organizational forms for choice-of-entity purposes is 
a project for another time. It should be noted for future research, though, that a similar choice-of-entity 













requires the corporate board of directors to place shareholder interests above 
all else in corporate decision-making.5 Shareholder primacy has been called 
the most fundamental concept in corporate governance and corporate law.6 
In this regard, the paradigm is widely embraced in the business, legal, and 
academic communities.  
A derivative of shareholder primacy is the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm7—in that the board’s perceived duty “is to make 
decisions that maximize the financial interests of the shareholders, rather 
than those of any other ‘stakeholders’ or constituencies.”8 This traditional 
shareholder-centric approach fosters the concept that corporations should 
focus solely on shareholder wealth maximization.9 Undoubtedly, though, 
 
5. Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV., 1951, 1951 
(2018). As used in this Article, shareholder primacy refers to the norm of prioritizing shareholder 
interests (especially financial interests) over the interests of other stakeholders (in essence, the question 
of whose interests prevail). The term is not used in the sense of corporate management modeling where 
the elements of corporate control lie with shareholders (in essence, the question of who is the ultimate 
decision-maker).  
6. Id. 
7. This focus of this Article is on the nexus between shareholder wealth maximization and 
corporate sustainability and social responsibility. It should be noted, though, that the terms “shareholder 
primacy” and “shareholder wealth maximization” are often conflated—but “one can have the latter 
without necessarily endorsing the former.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance 7 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 02-06, 2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=300860; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means 
and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574 (2003). 
8. WALTER A. EFFROSS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 16 (2010) 
(footnote omitted); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th Anniversary ed. 
2002) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]; Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 [hereinafter 
Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine]. 
9. For discussions concerning the shareholder wealth maximization norm, see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145 (1932); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit 
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012). For discussions concerning corporate 
considerations other than shareholder wealth-maximization, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
733 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247 (1999); Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1185 (2013); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate 
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for 
Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 720–21 (2014); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate 
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006); David Millon, Radical Shareholder 
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013). 












there is tension between shareholder profit maximization norms and 
sustainability paradigms when using a corporate organizational form for a 
socially conscious business construct. 
So, what exactly is sustainability? Generally speaking, sustainability is a 
relatively new—and evolving—management archetype in which 
corporations prioritize meeting the “needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”10 
Sustainability envisions business strategies that focus on the ethical, social, 
environmental, cultural, and economic dimensions of doing business.11 It 
requires corporations to pursue societal goals—for example, goals related 
to sustainable development, environmental protection, social justice, and 
equality—in addition to pursuing economic development.12 
Sustainability encompasses three organizational ideologies: sustainable 
environmental development, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
economics. Sustainable environmental development is a “dialectical 
concept that balances the need for economic growth with environmental 
protection and social equity.”13 CSR is a broad concept that deals with the 
role of business in society. This concept posits that corporations should be 
involved in social change.14 Finally, economics embraces how companies 
balance profits and sustainability.15  
Sustainability practices may sometimes detract from maximizing 
shareholder wealth, a result that contravenes one of the perceived major 
tenants of the shareholder primacy model.16 Thus, in an attempt to 
 
10. U.N. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). This Article 
does not opine about whether corporations should embrace sustainability but whether the business trust 
offers an attractive alternative organizational form for socially-conscious entrepreneurs who desire to 
pursue sustainability as a business initiative.  
11. See EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 401–02. 
12. Mel Wilson, Corporate Sustainability: What Is It and Where Does It Come from?, IVEY BUS. 
J. (Mar./Apr. 2003), https://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/corporate-sustainability-what-is-it-and 
-where-does-it-come-from/ [https://perma.cc/7YK4-9QRJ]. 
13. Id. 
14. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 399. 
15. Wilson, supra note 12. 
16. While some scholars and economists advocate that certain sustainability practices and CSR 
initiatives may be wealth maximizing, other types of sustainable practices may not be. For an argument 
that sustainability may be wealth maximizing, see generally Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 
Compliance, Detection, and Mergers and Acquisitions, 34 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 514 (2013); 
Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 
403 (2003). For an argument that sustainability may not be wealth maximizing, see generally Michael 
L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship Between Social 
Responsibility and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1101 (2006); Michael L. Barnett 













accommodate the sustainability trend, states have begun to implement 
mechanisms to free corporations from the strict shareholder primacy model. 
Such mechanisms include constituency statutes and new corporate forms 
called benefit corporations and social-purpose corporations.17 Though well-
intentioned, these mechanisms may not be ideal: they implicate strict 
requirements characteristic of most corporate law and may not provide the 
flexibility that socially-conscious entrepreneurs need to fulfill their visions. 
Business trusts, however, provide an alternative organizational form to 
efficiently effectuate the evolving paradigm of business sustainability.18 The 
dual goals of seeking profits while being socially responsible can co-exist 
more organically within a trust structure than within a corporate structure 
that is constrained with burdensome common law doctrines and potential 
regulatory intrusion. Positively, business trusts are a flexible—and vetted—
organizational form that can be used to implement sustainability practices 
without breaching shareholder primacy’s profit maximization restrictions. 
Normatively, business trusts provide a cohesive means to implement the 
goals of a sustainability management paradigm.  
While business trusts have been mostly overlooked, in favor of 
corporations, by entrepreneurs who wish to start an operating business,19 
 
Between Social and Financial Performance, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1304 (2012). For example, with 
the Trump Administration’s environmental protection rollbacks for the coal industry, coal companies 
that continue to implement the old, more environmentally-friendly practices will be less profitable than 
companies that follow the new, lower standards. See Trump’s Environmental Rollback Rolls on, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46471447 [https://perma.cc/V3H8-
ZRT4]. Here, environmentally-sustainable practices may not be wealth maximizing, though still 
profitable. Unlike other industries, the power industry does not offer a wide range of consumer choice. 
For example, a consumer choosing between two types of coffee in the grocery store—one type from a 
company that adheres to free trade policies and another type from a company that does not—can easily 
pick the free trade coffee. Consumers do not have readily available options when it comes to their power. 
Because sustainability practices may not influence consumer choice in the coal industry, the less 
sustainable companies may maintain their customer bases with less environmental expenses. This 
Article focuses on this type of sustainability—the kind that does not always maximize profits, which 
contravenes the shareholder primacy model. It is important to note, however, that while this type of 
sustainability may not maximize shareholder profits, neither does it sacrifice profitability. 
17. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163, 169 (2008) (discussing state constituency statutes); Tritt & Teschner, Amazon Delivers 
Diversity, supra note 3, at 13–17 (discussing social purpose corporations and state constituency statutes); 
Tina H. Ho, Note, Social Purpose Corporations: The Next Targets for Greenwashing Practices and 
Crowdfunding Scams, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 935 (2015) (discussing the new entity, social 
purpose corporations). 
18. Similar to corporations, the business trust structure is flexible enough to handle large scale 
business operations such as those listed on the SGX. See Securities Prices, SGX, https://www2.sgx.com/ 
securities/securities-prices [https://perma.cc/ZC9G-UWJ3]. 
19. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
31, 34. Not only have business trusts been overlooked by entrepreneurs, they have largely been ignored 












this Article discusses why the U.S. business world should consider this form 
for sustainability purposes.20 Specifically, two characteristics of the 
business trust make it an attractive organizational alternative for socially-
conscious entrepreneurs. First, business trusts offer a superior structure for 
sustainability because trustees are not deemed to be the agents of the 
beneficial owners. This structure means that trusts need not adhere to the 
strict shareholder primacy model. Second, business trusts allow for 
increased flexibility through default rules that can be modified through 
drafting. For example, Delaware’s statutory trust act caveats most of its 
provisions with “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in the governing 
instrument.”21 This allows business trusts to “learn, adapt, and regularly 
 
in modern legal scholarship. Id. Accordingly, this Article seeks to contribute to the call for research in 
this area. See id. at 35 (Professor Sitkoff appealing for academic research regarding business trusts).  
20. By contrast, these trusts have seen major success overseas. For example, in Singapore, 
business trusts, along with Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), make up the majority of IPOs on the 
Singapore Exchange. See, e.g., Singapore’s 2017 IPO Market Dominated by Trusts’ Strong 
Performance, DELOITTE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/sg/en/pages/audit/articles/sg-2017 
-ipo-market-press-release.html [https://perma.cc/5L7K-AE26] (“Proceeds from the overall Trusts 
market has improved from S$0.3 billion raised in 2015 to S$1.9 billion raised in 2016. To date, 20 Trusts 
have listed since the beginning of 2013, creating market vibrancy and raising a total of S$13.9 billion.”); 
Angela Tan, Reits, Business Trusts, F&B to Drive IPOs on SGX in 2018, BUS. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:50 
AM), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/reits-business-trusts-fb-to-drive-ipos-on-
sgx-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/Q27L-QBPS]; Angela Tan, Reits, Business Trusts to Continue to Drive 
IPOs on SGX: PwC Report, STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 3, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/busin 
ess/companies-markets/reits-business-trusts-to-continue-to-drive-ipos-on-sgx-pwc-report [https://perm 
a.cc/YLY9-S2WC] (“The year 2017 was a brilliant one for IPOs in Singapore. With the market upturn, 
we see that real estate investment trusts (Reits) and business trusts (BTs) continue to dominate the market 
making up 88 per cent [sic] of total funds raised . . . .” (quotations omitted)); see also Aradhana 
Aravindan & Anshuman Daga, Singtel’s NetLink Makes Tepid Debut; More Singapore IPOs in the 
Pipeline, REUTERS (July 19, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/netlink-trust-listing/singt 
els-netlink-makes-tepid-debut-more-singapore-ipos-in-pipeline-idINKBN1A411D [https://perma.cc/J 
HV3-2QBT] (“In recent years, SGX has become an attractive destination for companies to list their 
global assets by way of REITS or business trusts, as yields of as much as 6–7 percent draw in strong 
participation from retail and institutional investors amid relatively low interest rates.”). Entrepreneurs in 
Singapore have the choice between many different business entities, yet the Singapore business trust 
remains a popular business form. See, e.g., Setting up in Singapore, ACRA, https://www.acra.gov.sg/com 
ponents/wireframes/howToGuidesChaptersDetails.aspx?pageid=1755&contentid=1757 (last updated 
Nov. 10, 2016). Still, something prompts the selection of the business trust form over the corporate form. 
In order to maintain viability in growing socially-conscious markets—both domestically and 
internationally—the U.S. will need to stay current with innovative, emerging economies. In the face of 
change, uncertainty surrounding business trusts in the United States may “provide[] an excellent reason 
for imitation of observed success.” See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic 
Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 219 (1950). Therefore, a look at Singapore business trusts may guide 
American entrepreneurs in building a successful business trust in the United States. See Lee-ford Tritt 
& Ryan Scott Teschner, The Rise of Business Trusts in Sustainable Neo-Innovative Economies, 88 U. 
CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Tritt & Teschner, Rise of Business Trusts] (comparing and 
contrasting U.S. business trusts and Singapore business trusts). 













transform themselves,” which is critical if companies are to prosper over 
time.22  
This Article is organized as follows: Part I discusses corporate 
governance and sustainability to further explain why corporations are not 
the ideal organizational form for a sustainability management model of 
business.23 Next, Part II provides an overview of the law and structure of 
corporations and business trusts. Finally, Part III of this Article explores the 
values that business trusts add to the growing sustainably-conscious 
business construct in the United States, focusing on their structure and 
flexibility. 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 
In today’s business world, there are business ideologies at play that go 
beyond financial benefits. Today’s talent pool for both employees and 
customers has grown quite shallow. With low barriers to entry for new 
competitors, rapidly developing technology, and the kaleidoscope of change 
created by the viral world of the internet, firms need to differentiate 
themselves. Today, firms do this by establishing corporate mission 
statements, publicly taking sides on important issues, or selecting causes to 
support. Yet, in their efforts to involve themselves in social issues, 
corporations are often constrained by corporate law. With obligations to 
shareholders and profitability at the forefront of organizations, it can be 
difficult for an organization to shift directions, take a stance on cultural or 
societal issues, invest in new technology, or even fend off paradigm-shifting 
competition. Therefore, entrepreneurs may want to look for a new structure 
for their businesses. 
“Corporate governance is the framework that defines the division of 
power in [a] corporation.”24 This framework has long been dominated by 
the shareholder primacy management paradigm, which prioritizes 
 
22. Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May–June 2017, at 50, 58. 
23. Future research should compare business trusts to other organizational entities, such as LLCs. 
Like business trusts, LLCs have their own form of flexibility. Specifically, LLCs give contractual 
flexibility in structuring the entity and its business purpose. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
1101(b) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”). 
24. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive 
Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 680 (2004).  












shareholder wealth.25 However, CSR26 and corporate sustainability27 are 
gaining popularity as alternative management models in the U.S. business 
world.28 States are now taking the intiative to help businesses that want to 
pursue sustainability without becoming non-profit entities. For example, 
states are enacting constituency statutes that allow corporations to consider 
stakeholder interests and creating new entities that take sustainability into 
account in their business models.29 This section discusses shareholder 
primacy, sustainability, and these state initiatives. 
A. Shareholder Primacy 
Shareholder primacy is the shareholder-centric management model of 
corporate governance, which focuses on maximizing the value of 
shareholder interests.30 It is the traditional corporate management paradigm, 
and it has been called the most fundamental concept in corporate 
governance and corporate law.31 The idea of shareholder primacy first 
 
25. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 8; Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom 
Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 770 (2009) (“According to the traditional corporate governance approach, 
directors have a duty to exercise corporate powers with the purpose of maximizing the corporation’s 
profits, thereby maximizing shareholder wealth.”); Jensen, supra note 8; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
8; Gary von Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or 
Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 462 (1994) (“Traditionally, it has been beyond the scope of corporate 
directors' duties to conduct corporate activities in furtherance of nonshareholder interests. Corporate 
governance, however, has gradually evolved and currently embraces an expansion of fiduciary duties to 
include the accommodation and consideration of nonshareholder constituencies.”). 
26. CSR is the method by which businesses consider stakeholders, such as employees, 
customers, and the surrounding community, not just shareholders. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 397–98. 
27. Corporate sustainability is an offshoot of CSR that focuses on “meet[ing] the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” U.N. WORLD 
COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 10, at 43; see also David G. Mandelbaum, Corporate 
Sustainability Strategies, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 27, 27 (2007) (“Dow Jones defined 
‘corporate sustainability’ as ‘a business approach that creates long-term shareholder value by embracing 
opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic, environmental and social developments.’” 
(quoting Corporate Sustainability, ROBECOSAM, http://www.sustainability-indices.com/sustainability-
assessment/corporate-sustainability.html [https://perma.cc/7YHR-ZRWD])). 
28. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 
221, 221–22 (2012) (“Despite being organized as a for-profit corporation, Ben & Jerry’s employs a triple 
bottom line—profits mixed with social and environmental missions.”); GameChangers: The World’s 
Top Purpose-Driven Organizations, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2013, 10:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/s 
kollworldforum/2013/11/04/gamechangers-the-worlds-top-purpose-driven-organizations/#f8152577b6 
41 [https://perma.cc/CD2D-722E] (“For-profits: Whole Foods, IDEO, Google, and Zappos are great 
examples of major corporations that have used traditional for-profit structures to scale their growth while 
implementing many untraditional practices that aren’t profit motivated.”). 
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
30. See supra notes 8, 25 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder primacy). 













appeared in courts in the 1800s,32 and it has since become the primary theory 
of corporate governance.33 In this regard, it is widely embraced in the 
business, legal, and academic communities. 
A derivative of the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance 
is the shareholder wealth maximization norm, “under which the board’s 
duty is to make decisions that maximize the financial interests of the 
shareholders, rather than those of any other ‘stakeholders’ or 
constituencies.”34 This model comports with the concept of capitalism and 
the general assumption that companies are created to make money. 
Shareholder wealth maximization norms have been touted by famous 
economists, like Milton Friedman35 and Stephen Bainbridge,36 and 
discussed by numerous legal scholars.37 In this model, shareholders lead the 
charge and society receives the product that maximizes profit.  
From a theoretical perspective, the foundation of shareholder primacy is 
that shareholders “own” the corporation and have ultimate authority over its 
business.38 Shareholders may thus demand that a corporation’s activities be 
conducted in accordance with their wishes.39 In essence, this sets up an 
agency-based model of the corporation. For instance, Friedman argued in 
his New York Times article that “the manager is the agent of the individuals 
who own the corporation” and that the manager’s primary “responsibility is 
to conduct the business in accordance with [the owners’] desires.”40 
 
32. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 296 (1998). 
33. David G. Yosifon, Opting out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation 
Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 462 (2017); see also Marshall M. Magaro, Note, Two Birds, One 
Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 
1149, 1149 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271, 1275 (1993)) (“[A] basic premise of corporation law is that 
a business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of such activities with a view to 
enhancing the corporation’s profit and the gains of the corporation’s owners, that is, the shareholders.”); 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed 
for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”). 
34. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
35. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 8, at 133 (“[T]here is one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition, without deception or fraud.”). 
36. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
37. See David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1015–16 
(2013) (stating that “shareholder primacy” first appeared in law review articles in 1989 and has since 
“become a basic element of corporate law discourse”); see also supra note 9. 
38. Bower & Paine, supra note 22, at 52.  
39. Id. 
40. Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine, supra note 8, at 33. 












Friedman characterizes the corporate executive as “an agent serving the 
interests of his principal.”41 This argument assumes that shareholders invest 
in the corporation solely to realize returns on those investments and that 
they select the directors to pursue that goal.  
The whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be 
selected by the stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving 
the interests of his principal. This justification disappears when the 
corporate executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for 
“social” purposes. He becomes in effect a public employe[e], a civil 
servant, even though he remains in name an employe[e] of a private 
enterprise.42  
Regarding any social responsibilities of businesses, Friedman noted that 
“[o]nly people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial 
person . . . ‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities.”43 
He discusses what it would mean for a corporate executive to have social 
responsibility, bringing up and condemning examples that sound very 
similar to initiatives businesses are actively taking today:44 
For example, that [the corporate executive] is to refrain from 
increasing the price of the product in order to contribute to the social 
objective of preventing inflation, even though a price increase would 
be in the best interests of the corporation. Or that he is to make 
expenditures on reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the 
best interests of the corporation or that is required by law in order to 
contribute to the social objective of improving the environment. Or 
that, at the expense of corporate profits, he is to hire “hardcore” 
unemployed instead of better-qualified available workmen to 
contribute to the social objective of reducing poverty.  
 
41. Id. at 122. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 33. 
44. Businesses like Amazon and Google include environmental protection in their sustainability 
initiatives. Sustainability, AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/sustainability [https://perma.cc/26 
GH-XZG7]; Google Sustainability, supra note 2. However, Friedman specifically said a corporation 
should not reduce pollution if it is not in the best interests of the corporation or required by law. 
Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine, supra note 8, at 33. The Trump Administration has rolled back EPA 
protections, so law requires even less protections than it used to require. See Trump’s Environmental 
Rollback Rolls on, supra note 16. This means that companies with environmentally-friendly sustainable 
practices will be hard-pressed to justify the costs of those practices as legal compliance. Unless those 
practices are in the best interest of the company—with an emphasis on the company’s profitability—













In each of these cases, the corporate executive would be spending 
someone else’s money for a general social interest. Insofar as his 
actions in accord with his “social responsibility” reduce returns to 
stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise 
the price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money. Insofar 
as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is spending 
their money.45 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling further developed these ideas in 
Theory of the Firm, which posited that shareholders want businesses to be 
conducted in a way that maximizes their own economic returns.46 To this 
end, they agree with Friedman that companies should not engage in acts of 
“social responsibility.”47 Bainbridge pointed out that the shareholder 
primacy model not only protects shareholders from directors spending the 
corporation’s earnings on social causes, but also from the directors’ own 
self-dealing.48  
From a legal perspective, the foundation of shareholder primacy lies in 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,49 an early case that is often cited to support the 
shareholder primacy model.50 The Ford company had a corporate policy to 
reduce the price of its cars every year.51 At the same time, it wanted to 
expand production by building a new manufacturing plant.52 Because of 
these two goals, the company decided to withhold special dividends from 
its shareholders.53 Before compelling Ford to declare special dividends for 
its shareholders, the court stated, “[a] business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.”54 In sum, the court did not allow 
Ford to justify withholding shareholder profit with social motives, namely 
making cars affordable for the general public.55 
Shareholder primacy is also included in state statutes, enforced by 
modern courts, and endorsed by scholarly organizations. In Delaware, the 
state of incorporation for many large corporations, including Google and 
 
45. Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine, supra note 8, at 33. 
46. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8. 
47. Id. at 311. 
48. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
49. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
50. Rhee, supra note 5, at 1958. 
51. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 684–85. 
55. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 17. 












Amazon,56 shareholder primacy is mandated by law.57 In Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,58 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
held that the Revlon corporation’s directors breached their duty of care 
when they “allowed considerations other than the maximization of 
shareholder profit to affect their judgment” during a takeover.59 
Additionally, the American Law Institute (ALI) states that a “corporation 
should have as its objective the conduct of business activity with a view to 
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”60  
Shareholder primacy, however, is not a limitless authorization for 
directors to maximize profits. Such limitations may include federal and state 
laws and regulations. Specifically, the ALI makes clear that corporations 
are still constrained by law.61 In some instances, this means corporations 
must consider stakeholders, not just shareholders. For example, pursuant to 
statutes like the Air Pollution Control Act of 195562 and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act,63 corporations must take certain steps to protect the 
environment.64 These efforts can be very costly,65 but corporations must still 
make them. Nevertheless, when not limited by laws or regulations, 
shareholder primacy generally requires the directors to maximize profits. 
Additionally, shareholder primacy does not completely bar companies 
from philanthropic activities. For example, in Revlon, while the Supreme 
Court of Delaware ultimately held that the directors had breached their 
fiduciary duties, it also said, “[a] board may have regard for various 
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are 
 
56. Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 5, 2018) (listing Delaware as Google’s state 
of incorporation); Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2018) (listing Delaware as 
Amazon’s state of incorporation). 
57. Rhee, supra note 5, at 1984. 
58. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
59. Id. at 185; see also Rhee, supra note 5, at 1984 (“Revlon mandates an enforceable duty to 
maximize shareholder wealth . . . .”). 
60. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 n.1 
(AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
61. Id. § 2.01(b)(1). 
62. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
63. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). 
64. See generally id. (creating requirements for companies to reduce water pollution); 69 Stat. 
322 (creating requirements for companies to reduce air pollution). 
65. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020: SUMMARY REPORT 2 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/s 
ites/production/files/2015-07/documents/summaryreport.pdf (“[T]he costs of public and private efforts 
to meet 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment requirements . . . are expected to reach an annual value of about 













rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”66 The court found 
that a board could not do this during the sale of the company, where the only 
objective is “to sell [the company] to the highest bidder.”67 However, this 
finding does not foreclose the possibility of a corporation considering social 
purposes in other situations, so long as such consideration maximizes 
shareholder interests. Further, Delaware specifically authorizes 
corporations to “[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, 
scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national 
emergency in aid thereof.”68 However, there are restrictions on this statutory 
authorization. Charitable gifts must be reasonable, and reasonableness is 
determined based on reference to the charitable deduction under the Internal 
Revenue Code.69 This limitation shows that shareholder benefit is still at the 
heart of Delaware corporate law, even when making charitable donations. 
Considering the limitations under Delaware’s corporate charitable donation 
statute and recognizing that the language in Revlon suggesting 
constituencies may be considered is dicta, Delaware corporations should 
still seek to maximize profits.  
B. Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability 
In contrast to the shareholder primacy model—which does not allow 
corporate directors to prioritize stakeholder interests in corporate decision-
making—is the concept of corporate social responsibility. CSR specifically 
considers stakeholder interests, “encouraging positive labor-management 
relationships, environmental stewardship, corporate philanthropy, and 
community engagement.”70 CSR attempts to combat “the potential negative 
social and environmental effects that may be created by economic entities 
in their pursuit of economic returns.”71 
 
66. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
67. Id. 
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2018). 
69. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
70. Michael J. Vargas, In Defense of E. Merrick Dodd: Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Modern Corporate Law and Investment Strategy, 73 BUS. LAW. 337, 348 (2018). 
71. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721 (2002). While Williams calls this view of corporations “pessimistic,” 
id., there are plenty of examples of corporations making harmful decisions in the name of shareholder 
profit. For example, the founder and president of a pharmaceutical company justified a 400% price 
increase of nitrofurantoin—an antibiotic essential for treating urinary tract infections—with profit 
maximization. Wayne Drash, Report: Pharma Exec Says He Had ‘Moral Requirement’ to Raise Drug 
Price 400%, CNN (Sept. 12, 2018, 9:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/11/health/dru g-price-hike-
moral-requirement-bn/index.html [https://perma.cc/VS6Y-KTJD].  












Although companies attempted to incorporate social purposes even 
earlier,72 CSR developed from the social issues that arose in the late 1960s.73 
Social organizations began arguing that companies could pursue social 
purposes while still producing profits.74 Throughout the years, the idea that 
consideration of stakeholder interests and profitability were not mutually 
exclusive continued to gain support.75 Bill Gates proposed hybrid 
companies that “would have a twin mission: making profits and also 
improving lives for those who don’t fully benefit from market forces.”76 
From Bill Gates’s concept came two other terms: the double bottom line 
and the triple bottom line.77 The double bottom line refers to a company’s 
profit and social goals, and the triple bottom line adds “environmental 
concerns” to this list.78 It is from these concepts that sustainability 
emerged.79  
Sustainability has been described in various ways. The United Nations 
has said sustainability is about meeting “the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”80 
Others have said “a sustainable corporation is one that creates profit for its 
shareholders while protecting the environment and improving the lives of 
those with whom it interacts.”81 In sum, sustainability marries CSR, Bill 
Gates’s hybrid companies, the double-bottom line, and the triple-bottom 
line. Sustainability recognizes that companies can create shareholder profit, 
consider immediate stakeholder interests, such as employee and customer 
interests, and consider their impact on the future of the world. In this model, 
 
72. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (“‘My ambition,’ 
declared Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting 
the greatest share of our profits back into the business.’”). 
73. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 399; see also Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and 
the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157, 157 (1970) (“As social problems have become more acute, all 
sectors of the community have been summoned by government and by public opinion to respond to the 
crisis. Business . . . has become part of the effort, and business participation in the social sphere—health, 
education, poverty, race relations, urban problems, and pollution abatement—is increasingly becoming 
a [sic] common-place.” (footnotes omitted)). 
74. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 399. 
75. Id. at 399–401. 
76. Bill Gates, A New Approach to Capitalism, in CREATIVE CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION 
WITH BILL GATES, WARREN BUFFETT, AND OTHER ECONOMIC LEADERS 7, 10 (Michael Kinsley & 
Conor Clarke eds., 2008). 
77. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 401. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. U.N. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 10, at 43. 
81. ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW TODAY’S BEST-
RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND HOW 













social good is built into the mission of the corporation and drives the product 
and eventual return to shareholders.  
Sustainability envisions business strategies that focus on the ethical, 
social, environmental, cultural, and economic dimensions of doing 
business.82 It requires corporations to pursue societal goals—such as those 
related to sustainable development, environmental protection, social justice 
and equality—in addition to pursuing economic development.83 
Sustainability encompasses three organizational ideologies: sustainable 
environmental development, CSR, and economics. Sustainable 
environmental development is a “dialectical concept that balances the need 
for economic growth with environmental protection and social equity.”84 
For example, while working on economic growth, many companies are also 
working on reducing their carbon footprints. CSR is a broad concept that 
deals with the role of business in society. This concept posits that 
corporations have an ethical obligation to consider and address the needs of 
society and not act solely in the interests of the shareholders, and that 
corporations should be involved in effectuating social change.85 Finally, 
economics embraces how companies balance profits and sustainability.86 
While there is no question that shareholder primacy has been the 
dominant model of corporate governance for decades, there has been debate 
about whether corporations can nonetheless properly incorporate 
sustainability practices. One legal scholar argues that corporations need not 
adhere to shareholder primacy if they so choose.87 Robert Rhee emphasizes 
this point by stating that “[s]hareholder primacy is a default norm only, and 
it can be subjugated to the interests of other constituents.”88 Another legal 
scholar argues that Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.—one of the primary cases 
cited for the proposition that corporations must put shareholder wealth 
maximization first89—is bad law.90 There are moments in Dodge that even 
 
82. See EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 401. 
83. See id. 
84. Wilson, supra note 12. 
85. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 399. 
86. See supra note 15. 
87. Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 177, 179–80 (2008). 
88. Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, 
and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 720 (2010). 
89. Rhee, supra note 5, at 1958.  
90. Stout, supra note 17, at 166 (“Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, at least when cited for the 
proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth.”). 












suggest corporations can consider stakeholders.91 Economist E. Merrick 
Dodd argued that corporations not only could consider stakeholder interests, 
but also should.92 For years, economist Adolf Berle argued against Dodd’s 
perspective and advocated for shareholder primacy.93 However, Berle 
eventually conceded that Dodd was right.94 Even major U.S. corporations 
have challenged the notion that they cannot take stakeholder interests into 
account. For example, Google has implemented sustainability practices95 
even though Delaware, its state of incorporation, embraces shareholder 
primacy.96 However, corporations that elevate stakeholder interests to a 
degree that their sustainability policies hinder maximizing shareholder 
interests might expose themselves to liability from their shareholders.97 And 
yet, as corporations strive to distinguish themselves—and as entrepreneurs 
become more socially conscious—working toward sustainability has 
become both more common and more important in the corporate world. 
What, then, can companies do to promote sustainability while protecting 
themselves from liability? 
C. Alternatives to Shareholder Primacy 
With the rise of sustainability practices among for-profit companies, 
states have made efforts to allow companies to safely pursue sustainability. 
States have done this primarily by adopting constituency statutes and 
creating benefit or social purpose corporations.98 This section discusses 
these two methods. 
 
91. For example, the court allowed Ford to expand its operations, even though Henry Ford said 
the motivation for doing so was to create more jobs in the local area. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 
N.W. 668, 671, 684 (Mich. 1919). The court also said, “[t]he discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain [shareholder profit], and does not extend to a change in the end itself.” Id. 
at 684. This could be read to mean a corporation cannot operate primarily for social purposes, but it can 
employ social purposes if the company is still profitable.  
92. Cheri A. Budzynski, Comment, Can a Feminist Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility 
Break down the Barriers of the Shareholder Primacy Doctrine?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 435, 440 (2006) 
(“Dodd argued that the trend of management-run corporations[] permitted corporations to take on 
responsibility to other constituencies. Dodd believed that public opinion would demand protection of 
these constituencies, especially for employees who lacked bargaining power.” (footnote omitted)). 
93. EFFROSS, supra note 8, at 14. 
94. Id. at 15. 
95. See GameChangers: The World’s Top Purpose-Driven Organizations, supra note 28. 
96. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
97. Yosifon, supra note 33, at 463 (“Uncertainty regarding what is permissible and what is 
forbidden will impede broad experimentation, and, where experimentation is undertaken in the face of 
such uncertainty, costly and disruptive litigation will lurk, and strike.”). 













1. Constituency Statutes 
Constituency statutes allow directors to consider non-shareholder 
constituents’ interests in the corporate decision-making process.99 These 
statutes seemingly do away with any concern about whether a corporation 
may consider stakeholder interests by expressly authorizing corporations to 
do so.100 Constituency statutes are included under states’ corporate codes,101 
so they seem to simply give the directors of standard corporations more 
discretion when making decisions. At first glance, these statutes may appear 
to be a solution to the sustainability problem. 
However, there are several problems with constituency statutes. First, 
while the majority of states have enacted a constituency statute in some 
form,102 Delaware has not,103 which means that many corporations are still 
vulnerable to the risk of being sued for sustainability.104 For corporations 
incorporated in states that have constituency statutes, there are application 
problems.105 For example, when Vermont enacted its constituency statute, 
the Vermont Attorney General noted that an “absence of Vermont law on 
the subject ma[de] it difficult to determine what effect the amendment ha[d] 
on the obligations of corporate directors.”106 Scholars have argued that 
constituency statutes do not create fiduciary duties to stakeholders,107 but 
 
99. Magaro, supra note 33, at 1150 (“Several states have implemented statutes allowing directors 
to consider these nonshareholder constituents’ interests in the corporate decision-making process.”); see 
also Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 14, 16 (1992) (“[T]he statutes purport to expand the traditional view that directors of 
corporations have a duty to make business decisions primarily, if not exclusively, to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth by explicitly permitting consideration of non-shareholder interests.”). 
100. Orts, supra note 99, at 14, 16. 
101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(g) (2018) (adding a constituency provision to the 
“[g]eneral standards of conduct for directors” statute under the state’s corporate code); FLA. STAT. 
§ 607.0830(3) (2018) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2018) (adding a constituency clause to 
Massachusetts’s corporate director duty statute). 
102. Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1793 (2018). 
103. See Facts and Myths, DEL. CORP. L., https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-and-myths/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9ZA-Q489] (comparing Delaware to states with more management protection, such 
as those with constituency statutes).  
104. Cf. Tritt & Teschner, Amazon Delivers Diversity, supra note 3, at 17 (“It has been argued 
that Delaware law permits a deviation from shareholder primacy through private ordering, but this is not 
entirely clear.” (footnote omitted)). 
105. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 975 (1992). 
106. Plerhoples, supra note 28, at 238 n.92 (quoting Informal Op., No. 2000-2, 2000 WL 
34416663, at *1 (Vt. A.G. Mar. 22, 2000)). 
107. Bainbridge, supra note 105, at 987 (“[Constituency] statutes should not be interpreted as 
creating new director fiduciary duties running to nonshareholder constituencies and the latter should not 
have standing under these statutes to seek judicial review of a director’s decision.”). This conclusion is 
supported by the permissive language in all state constituency statutes. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 












without clear guidelines, corporations in “constituency-statute states”108 are 
no better off, in terms of risk, than corporations in states without 
constituency statutes. While corporations in states like Delaware may have 
to worry about whether their sustainability efforts will result in a 
shareholder suit, corporations in states with constituency statutes may have 
to worry about whether their profitability efforts will result in stakeholder 
suits. 
Constituency statutes also enumerate which stakeholder interests 
corporations may consider,109 and such enumeration does not allow 
corporations much flexibility in their sustainability efforts. While some 
constituency statutes have broad categories,110 others are quite narrow. For 
example, New York’s constituency statute limits the consideration of 
stakeholder interests to the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors, 
and community.111 While the “community” category may seem broad, it is 
limited to the community “in which [the corporation] does business.”112 
Conceivably, a New York corporation that does business exclusively in 
New York could not focus its sustainability efforts on fair trade for 
underprivileged countries. 
Additionally, some statutes “specify that no single interest may 
dominate.”113 Again, this limits corporations’ flexibility. For example, a 
corporation that wishes to focus its sustainability efforts on promoting the 
 
11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 2017) (“In determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, a director of a corporation . . . may, in addition, consider the interests of the 
corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the State, region and nation, 
community and societal considerations, including those of any community in which any offices or 
facilities of the corporation are located . . . .” (emphasis added)). Connecticut used to have a mandatory 
constituency statute, see Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 
2007 (2009), but it has since amended its statute to make it permissive. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-
756(g) (2018). 
108. This Article labels states that have enacted constituency statutes “constituency-statute 
states.”  
109. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2004). 
110. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(g) (“[A director] may consider, in determining what 
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well 
as the short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the shareholders, long-term as well as 
short-term, including the possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors 
and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations, including those of any community in 
which any office or other facility of the corporation is located. A director may also consider, in the 
discretion of such director, any other factors the director reasonably considers appropriate in determining 
what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”). 
111. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2017). 
112. Id. § 717(b)(v). 













LGBTQ community—like Amazon114—may be precluded from this focus 
in a constituency-statute state whose statute prohibits primacy of a single 
interest.  
Finally, some states’ constituency statutes are limited to takeovers and 
other control transactions.115 This type of limitation could prevent a 
corporation from pursuing the vast majority of sustainability efforts it may 
wish to pursue. While a corporation could consider its employees’ interests 
in negotiating an acquisition, guaranteeing their continued employment in 
exchange for a lower purchase price from the acquirer, it could not forgo 
shareholder profits to prevent layoffs without such a transaction taking 
place. 
While constituency statutes have allowed a step toward sustainability, 
they have their downfalls. In particular, these statutes sometimes have 
significant limitations. If corporations wish to have flexibility in working 
toward sustainability, constituency statutes may not provide it. 
Additionally, corporations cannot take advantage of both the significant 
benefits of incorporating in Delaware and the benefits of constituency 
statutes, because Delaware is not a constituency-statute state. Further, while 
these statutes likely do not create fiduciary duties toward stakeholders, their 
application is still uncertain. 
2. Social-Purpose and Benefit Corporations 
Some states have addressed the rise in sustainability-consciousness by 
creating new entities. Some states, like Washington, created social purpose 
corporations.116 Others, like Delaware, created benefit corporations.117 Both 
of these entities are for-profit corporations that “consider[] both social and 
shareholders’ interests.”118 Additionally, both entities must designate a 
social purpose in their charters.119 
To fully appreciate either social purpose corporations or benefit 
corporations, it is important to understand the differences between the two 
 
114. See generally Tritt & Teschner, Amazon Dilivers Diversity, supra note 3, at 19–23 
(discussing Amazon’s LGBT initiatives in the context of Amazon’s HQ2 decision). 
115. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 588 (1992); see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2017); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2018).  
116. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.010 (2018). 
117. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2018). 
118. Ho, supra note 17, at 935. 
119. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 383 (2017); Corp. 
Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1087–89 
(2013). 












entities. The most significant distinction is that a social purpose corporation 
may consider stakeholder interests when making decisions, while a benefit 
corporation must consider stakeholder interests when making decisions.120 
For example, under Washington’s social purpose corporation statute, “the 
director of a social purpose corporation may consider and give weight to 
one or more of the social purposes of the corporation as the director deems 
relevant.”121 By contrast, under Delaware’s benefit corporation statute,  
[t]he board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs 
of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.122 
Another significant difference is that social purpose corporations may 
amend their social purpose, while benefit corporations cannot.123 
Based on the differences between benefit corporations and social 
purpose corporations, one problem with benefit corporations is apparent: 
increased liability. Benefit corporation directors not only have fiduciary 
duties toward their shareholders, they also have fiduciary duties toward their 
stakeholders.124 A corporation that wants to pursue sustainability while 
taking advantage of Delaware’s corporate law can do this by becoming a 
benefit corporation, but it must do so at its peril.  
Another problem with both social purpose corporations and benefit 
corporations, though a more significant problem for benefit corporations, is 
a lack of flexibility. Benefit corporations and social purpose corporations 
are limited to the social purposes enumerated in their charters.125 If one of 
these entities selects “environmental efforts” as its social purpose, it could 
face liability for considering the interests of its employees. Benefit 
corporations, once they have announced their social purpose, cannot change 
it.126 Thus, someone who wishes to create a benefit corporation must think 
carefully before creating the corporation’s charter. Social purpose 
 
120. Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, supra note 119, at 1087–88. 
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.050(2) (emphasis added). 
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (emphasis added). 
123. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 89, 108 (2015). 
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365. Directors’ fiduciary duties toward stakeholders may be 
triggered in social purpose corporations when such corporations “act like” benefit corporations by 
considering stakeholder interests when making decisions.  
125. See, e.g., id. § 365(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.050(2). 













corporations can amend their social purpose, but an amendment of this kind 
requires at least a two-thirds shareholder vote.127 If a supermajority of the 
shareholders do not agree on a new social purpose, the social purpose 
corporation is stuck.  
States with these new entities are trying to promote sustainability. 
However, these entities’ inflexibility and increased liability issues may 
make them less desirable mechanisms for pursuing sustainability. Because 
of these problems, many potential business owners may hesitate to 
incorporate as either a social purpose corporation or a benefit corporation.  
Instead of states creating novel and untested organizational forms to 
accommodate the evolving sustainability movement, we advocate a return 
to business trusts. Trust law initially impacted the evolution of corporate 
law.128 In essence, business trusts gave way to modern corporations,129 
which were misused, leading to strict rules on corporate governance. 
Shareholder primacy became the primary model of corporate governance. 
Now, sustainability is gaining popularity and entrepreneurs are seeking 
ways to incorporate this practice into their businesses without breaching 
shareholder primacy. This brings them full circle back to business trusts, 
which can be used to safely implement sustainability into a profitable 
business. Business trusts, as an organizational form, offer a simpler, vetted 
solution for sustainability-conscious business entrepreneurs. Therefore, a 
discussion of corporations and trusts as organizational forms is in order.  
 
127. Id. 
128. See John Morley, Essay, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-
American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2145–47 (2016). The author discusses how, as 
a matter of judicial doctrine, the trust form offered several key features of the corporate form, such as 
entity shielding, limited liability, and capital lock-in. Id. at 2146. Thus, many businesses in the mid-
nineteenth century preferred the trust form over general incorporation statutes because it was more cost-
efficient than the corporation. Id. at 2146–47. The author also points out how the historical use of trusts 
leads to an understanding of the development of business law, id. at 2147, and how business trusts 
remained popular until the 1920s, as demonstrated by the monopoly trusts that resulted in the anti-trust 
movement of the 1880s, id. at 2164; see also Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust 
Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2292–93 (2013) (discussing how large firms in the late 1800s, 
such as Standard Oil, adopted the trust structure to escape the limitations imposed by state corporation 
laws, which led to the creation of antitrust legislation—laws designed to foster a competitive market by 
eliminating monopoly power). This is why United States anti-predatory business laws are referred to as 
“anti-trust” laws, while other countries refer to these types of laws as competition laws. Morley, supra 
note 128, at 2164. 
129. See Morley, supra note 128, at 2166.  















Introducing business trusts into sustainability discourse requires an 
elementary review of both corporations and business trusts as organizational 
forms. A rudimentary understanding of these organizational forms is 
necessary in order to appreciate the opportunities business trusts afford 
socially-conscious entrepreneurs. 
A. An Elementary Overview of Corporations 
Concepts and theories regarding corporate structure and organizations 
are well-developed. Before analyzing the benefits and disadvantages of 
business trusts and corporations from the perspective of socially-conscious 
 
130. This figure illustrates the evolution of the use and the future potential use of business trusts 













entrepreneurs, it is important to briefly discuss and identify the legal 
attributes of corporations, as well as the principal of agency relationships 
within corporations. There are several different types of business 
organization forms, such as limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited 
partnerships (LPs). However, corporations still constitute a large number of 
total entities. Therefore, the comparison of business trusts to corporations is 
used solely for the purpose of introducing business trusts to the ongoing 
sustainability dialogue. The continued use of corporations, despite the 
creation of other business entities, is attributable to several features of the 
corporate structure. These important features include limited liability, 
indefinite duration, separation of ownership and control, fully transferrable 
shares, and the delegation of management to a board of directors.131  
1. Corporate Structure and Organization 
As a general overview, corporations are legal entities that are “separate 
and distinct” from their owners and shareholders.132 Thus, corporations are 
legal persons that can execute contracts, own and sell property, be sued, and 
conduct many other business transactions. Since corporations are separate 
and distinct entities, they provide limited liability protection to their 
shareholders, known as the “corporate veil.”133 As equity-holders, 
shareholders “own” the corporation,134 but actually have “virtually no 
decisionmaking powers—just the right to elect the firm’s directors and to 
vote on an exceedingly limited—albeit not unimportant—number of 
 
131. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 1 (3d ed. 2015); John Armour et al., What 
is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 1, 1–2 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing the five most important 
features of corporations).  
132. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2002) (“A defining characteristic of public corporations is the so-called separation of 
ownership and control.”); Sidney Turner, What You Should Know About Limiting Personal Liability: 
The Reality of Piercing the Corporate Veil and Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 31 
WESTCHESTER B.J. 33, 33 (2004); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Comment, The Alter Ego Doctrine: 
Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 UCLA L. REV. 129, 129 (1982).  
133. Sonora Diamond Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836 (“A corporate identity may be disregarded—
the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the equitable 
ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.”); see also Turner, supra note 132 
(noting how a corporation’s existence as a separate and distinct legal entity provides immunity to its 
shareholders by protecting their personal assets from creditors of the corporation, known as the 
“corporate veil”).  
134. Bainbridge, supra note 132, at 4 (noting how shareholders are “said to ‘own’ the firm”).  












corporate actions.”135 Rather, state statutes delegate management to the 
board of directors, who then delegate the day-to-day responsibilities to the 
officers and other employees within the corporation.136 This outlines the 
separation of ownership and control within corporations. 
One of the primary benefits of recognizing corporations as distinct from 
their owners is that shareholders enjoy “limited liability.”137 Limited 
liability means that in the event corporate assets are insufficient to pay 
corporate obligations, individual shareholders are not responsible for 
covering corporate debts.138 The maximum loss each shareholder can suffer 
is limited to the money she invested to acquire the corporate stock. If a 
creditor sues a corporation, the corporate entity generally shields 
shareholders from involvement with such litigation. Additionally, if a 
corporation exhausts its cash reserves and financing options, it can file for 
bankruptcy or cease to exist. Shareholders are under no obligation to 
continue funding corporate operations. Thus, from a limited liability 
perspective, shareholders benefit from the treatment of corporations as 
separate legal entities.   
In addition to limited liability, corporate stock ownership offers 
transferability benefits. Investors readily buy and sell publicly-traded shares 
using established stock exchanges.139 Moreover, shareholders generally do 
not disrupt corporate operations when stock is transferred. Management 
continues to function independently from its shareholders.   
Finally, from a financial reporting perspective, corporations offer the 
advantage of administrative convenience. Typically, annual reporting is 
performed at the corporate level and considers the corporation as a whole. 
Corporations do not treat shareholders differently. Rather, stock ownership 
is used to equitably allocate corporate interests. Although corporations may 
offer different classes of stock, similarly-situated shareholders receive 
corporate distributions pro-rata.140 
 
135. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 131, at 3. 
136. Id.  
137. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
138. Armour et al., supra note 131, at 9. 
139. There are generally more restrictions on transfers of private company stock. A detailed 
discussion of stock transfers is beyond the scope of this article. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental 
Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414 (2006) (“Shareholders also can benefit 
economically by selling their shares at a profit. One of the key characteristics of corporations is the free 
transferability of shares: shareholders can sell shares at will.”). 













In terms of governance, the laws governing corporations are derived 
primarily from state law.141 Public corporations are created by filing a 
charter document, known as the “articles of incorporation,” with a state.142 
As a result, the state statute governing a corporation provides for mandatory 
and default rules.143 The existence of default rules allows for a great deal of 
private ordering by enabling corporations to contract around them in their 
bylaws. Therefore, a corporation’s bylaws act as a governing statute, 
specifying the duties and responsibilities of the corporation’s directors, 
officers, and shareholders, as well as other procedural rules. Since 
corporations are “creature[s] of statute” to a certain extent, they must act 
through their officers, directors, and agents.144 Therefore, agency cost 
theories have been applied to corporations and the agency-principal 
relationships within them.145 However, it is important to note that the 
increased growth and sophistication of state corporate laws has diminished 
the need for agency law to be used as a gap-filler.146 
Before discussing the law of agency as applied to corporations, it is 
important to briefly discuss the managerial structure of corporations. As 
mentioned above, shareholders are owners, but the “locus of management” 
for a corporation is its board of directors.147 Shareholders do not have the 
power to initiate corporate action and may only partake in a number of board 
actions.148 Rather, the board of directors has the authority to appoint officers 
 
141. See Armour et al., supra note 131, at 5 (“In virtually all economically important jurisdictions, 
there is a basic statute that provides for the formation of firms . . . .”).  
142. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 131, at 8. 
143. Armour et al., supra note 131, at 20. 
144. See State v. J.P. Lamb Land Co., 401 N.W.2d 713, 717 (N.D. 1987) (“A corporation is a 
creature of statute which cannot exist without the consent of the sovereign, and the power to create a 
corporation is an attribute of sovereignty.”).  
145. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 
(2004) (“Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate law and 
economics.”).  
146. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2003) (noting how state corporate laws have reduced the 
need for reliance on agency laws, but agency laws are still used as gap-fillers in areas where corporate 
law has not been fully developed).  
147. Thomas Earl Geu, A Selective Overview of Agency, Good Faith and Delaware Entity Law, 
10 DEL. L. REV. 17, 30 (2008); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“Except as may be provided in an agreement authorized under section 7.32, and subject to any limitation 
in the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b), all corporate powers shall be exercised by 
or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be 
managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.” (emphasis 
added)).  
148. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 131, at 3; Bainbridge, supra note 132, at 4. 












to perform various tasks, thus invoking the law of agency to “fill gaps in the 
law governing corporate relationships.”149 “[T]he board’s role is to 
formulate broad policy and oversee the subordinates who actually conduct 
the business day-to-day.”150 Most importantly, the board is responsible for 
overseeing and disciplining “top management.”151 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines agency as “the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to 
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf 
and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”152 Therefore, it has been argued that there are 
several agent-principal relationships within a corporation: officers as agents 
and the corporation as principal, which is managed by the board of 
directors,153 and shareholders as principals and directors as agents.154 For 
example, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman categorize the decision-
makers of a corporation as the board of directors (the managers) and the 
beneficial “owners” (or beneficiaries) as the shareholders.155 Hansmann and 
 
149. Geu, supra note 147, at 30–32; see also Bainbridge, supra note 132, at 5 (“[P]ublic 
corporations traditionally have been characterized not by participatory democracy, but rather by 
hierarchies in which decisions are made on a more-or-less authoritarian basis.”).  
150. Bainbridge, supra note 132, at 5. 
151. Id. at 8.  
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
153. See Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847, 852 
(2017) (“Directors act as or on behalf of the principal in a relationship with officers as the corporation’s 
agents.”); Geu, supra note 147, at 31. However, it is important to note that an agency relationship will 
only arise if the elements of agency are satisfied. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c. 
More specifically, an agency relationship arises when there is a manifestation of consent by the 
principal that the agent act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and 
the agent consents to so act. The requisite manifestation of consent can be implied from the 
circumstances, which makes it possible for the parties to have formed a legally effective agency 
relationship without realizing they had done so. Corporate employees, especially officers, are 
generally regarded as agents of the corporation.  
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 131, at 90. 
154. See Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals, in KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE 
LAW AND EQUITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HAROLD FORD 105, 105–06 (Ian M. Ramsay ed., 
2002). In this article, Deborah A. DeMott discusses the natural tendency to view shareholders as 
principals and directors as their agents because the shareholders have the ability to choose directors by 
electing them to office. Id. Once elected, the directors “hold discretionary management power over the 
corporation and thus make decisions that affect the economic well-being of shareholders. In exercising 
their managerial power, directors are subject to fiduciary duties, as are agents when acting within the 
scope of the agency relationship.” Id. at 105. However, “[c]ontemporary corporate law does not treat 
directors as shareholders’ agents other than in a loose or metaphorical sense. If fully applicable to 
directors’ relationships to shareholders, the common law of agency would destabilize the legal 
consequences that contemporary corporate law facilitates.” Id. at 106. 
155. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 













Kraakman state that the managers “may . . . be distinct from the persons for 
whose benefit the managers are charged to act” which, in this case, are a 
corporation’s shareholders.156 
2. Taxation 
As explained above, a corporation is owned by its shareholders. There is 
no minimum or maximum number of shareholders required to form a 
corporation. Even a single-member LLC may incorporate and own all the 
outstanding shares of a corporation.157 Most publicly-traded companies, 
however, have significantly more than one shareholder. Despite being 
owners, shareholders do not report corporate income on their personal 
income tax returns as the income is earned. Instead, corporations report 
income and pay taxes at the corporate level.158 Compared with other 
businesses, there is greater distinction between the corporate entity and its 
owners, a distinguishing feature with both potential benefits and 
disadvantages.  
To begin with, corporate income is subject to a flat corporate tax rate. 
Unlike individuals, who are subject to various tax rates depending on the 
character of their income, corporations pay the corporate income tax rate on 
all sources of income.159 For 2018, the federal corporate tax rate is 21%.160 
 
156. Id.  
157. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2018). 
158. This section is limited to a review of corporations as defined in Subchapter C of the Internal 
Revenue Code. A small business corporation that satisfies the requirements of Section 1361(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code and elects to be classified as an S-corporation using IRS Form 2553 will be 
treated as a partnership for tax purposes. A detailed review of S-corporations is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  
159. Individuals pay ordinary income tax rates and capital income tax rates. Corporations pay the 
21% corporate income tax rate on capital gains. Corporations track capital gains and losses, but are only 
permitted to use capital losses to offset capital gains. Unused capital gains are carried forward until they 
may be used against capital gains.  
160. I.R.C. § 11 (Supp. V 2018). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) significantly changed 
the federal corporate tax rate in the United States. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 115–97 (Comm. Print 2018) (explaining these 
changes). Effective January 1, 2018, the TCJA reduced the federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. 
Id. at 101. Prior to 2018, the United States had one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world. See 
Kyle Pomerleau, The United States’ Corporate Income Tax Rate is Now More in Line with Those Levied 
by Other Major Nations, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/us-corporate-income-
tax-more-competitive/ [https://perma.cc/TT7B-745W]. Many saw the high corporate tax rate as an 
incentive to move business operations to non-U.S. jurisdictions. Aparna Mathur, How to Help Close the 
Tax Gap, AEI (May 27, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-help-close-the-tax-gap/ [https://p 
erma.cc/RQ4C-SDL4]. The recent reduction in the federal corporate tax rate has been heralded as a 












Compared to other business entities, corporate recordkeeping is relatively 
straightforward and efficient.161  
The biggest disadvantage of treating corporations as separate legal 
entities is the effect of “double taxation.” Essentially, double taxation occurs 
because corporate income is taxed at the corporate level when earned and 
again at the shareholder level when distributed.162 Historically, corporations 
have distributed earnings to shareholders through cash dividends. The 
amount paid to each shareholder depends on the number of shares owned 
by each shareholder as of a specific date.163 Significantly, corporations are 
not allowed to reduce net income by cash set aside for dividend 
distributions. Dividends are deemed to be paid out of accumulated earnings 
and profits, which were taxed in previous years.164 Thus, corporations pay 
income taxes on the earnings distributed as dividends. The same earnings 
are taxed again when shareholders receive dividend distributions.165 
Shareholders must report dividends as income in the year received.166 To 
help address the effect of double taxation, dividends are taxed at capital 
gains rates, which are less than ordinary individual income tax rates.167 Only 
 
major victory in making the United States competitive with other industrialized countries. A detailed 
discussion of the TCJA is beyond the scope of this article. 
161. Alternatively, partnerships (including limited liability companies and S-corporations treated 
as partnerships for tax purposes) must track income and equity at both the entity level and the individual 
level. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (2018). The Internal Revenue Code requires partnerships to use capital 
accounts to track each partner’s basis in the entity. As such, a partnership must first calculate the total 
amount of income, gains, losses, deductions, credits, and contributions received during the year at the 
partnership level and then allocate each item among the various capital accounts in accordance with 
specific ratios contained in its partnership agreement (or default rules provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1). As part of the partnership’s tax return (Form 1065), individual Schedule K-1s are prepared for each 
partner, listing their relative shares of income, gains, losses, deductions and credits from the partnership. 
Each partner receives a copy of her Schedule K-1 and incorporates the information into her personal 
income tax return. While the partnership owes no tax at the partnership level, the character of each item 
flows through to individual partners. For example, capital gains received by the partnership are also 
capital gains in the hands of the partners.  
162. I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 (2018).  
163. State statutes govern when corporate shareholders are deemed to own stock for purposes of 
receiving dividends.  
164. State statutes often disallow corporate dividend distributions unless there are sufficient 
accumulated earnings and profits available. See, e.g., Topic Number 404—Dividends, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc404 [https://perma.cc/RKK2-9ULB] (discussing how dividends are 
paid out of accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation).  
165. I.R.C. § 61. 
166. Id.  
167. For 2018, individuals subject to an ordinary income tax of 0%, 10%, or 12% pay a capital 
gains tax at a rate of 0%; individuals subject to an ordinary income tax of 22%, 24%, 32%, or 35% pay 
a capital gains tax at a rate of 15%; and individuals subject to ordinary income tax of 37% pay capital 
gains tax at a rate of 20%. I.R.C. § 1. Additionally, taxpayers with income above a certain threshold 













shareholders’ initial stock investment will be returned tax-free (upon 
dissolution of the company). All other distributed earnings, whether during 
the life of the corporation or at dissolution, are subject to tax.168  
In addition to federal income taxes, corporations are also subject to state 
income taxes. Generally, corporate law is state law. States have broad 
discretion in regulating and taxing business entities within their boundaries. 
All corporations, regardless of where they are incorporated, are subject to 
the federal income tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. A detailed 
analysis of state-specific statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.  
B. An Elementary Overview of U.S. Business Trusts169 
A cogent analysis of business trusts as an organizational form for 
socially-conscious entrepreneurs must contain (1) a discussion of some 
basic tenets of trust law; (2) an exploration of trusts as organizations; (3) an 
elementary overview of the basic principles of business trusts; (4) a look at 
Delaware business trust law; and (5) an overview of business trust taxation.  
1. Common Law Principles of Private Donative Trusts 
When people generally think about trusts, they most likely think about 
private donative trusts. In essence, private donative trusts provide a means 
for individuals to make gifts. Although most gifts involve a donor simply 
giving a gift outright to the donee, a gift through a trust conceptually splits 
the gift between a trustee and beneficiary. Essentially, trusts create two 
distinct elements of asset ownership: (1) legal title; and (2) beneficial 
ownership.170 In a gift to a trust, the trustee acquires legal title to the trust 
property, while the equitable title of trust property rests with the 
beneficiaries. 
 
168. I.R.C. § 1411. Note distributions of earnings are distinguished from salaries and wages. If a 
shareholder is also an employee, the corporation is allowed a deduction for salaries and wages paid while 
the employee pays ordinary income taxes on salaries and wages received. Thus, salaries and wages are 
not subject to double-taxation.  
169. The primary focus of this Article is on business trusts. Although private trusts carry 
noteworthy donative importance, and charitable trusts play their own significant role in American 
society, this Article’s discussion of sustainability applies solely to business trusts.  
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 












In creating a trust, the settlor171 gives property to a trustee to hold for the 
benefit of a beneficiary upon the terms and conditions that the settlor 
imposes.172 Trust law has historically aimed to effectuate the settlor’s 
intent.173 “In this regard, the settlor faces few restraints when formulating 
the details of the trust instrument.”174 Therefore, trust law consists 
overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor can alter or reject—
providing great flexibility for the settlor to tailor the trust to her wishes.175 
This regime reinforces one of the primary policy goals of private donative 
trusts: donative freedom. 
A fiduciary relation arises because the trustee (the legal owner) 
shepherds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary in accordance 
with the purpose of the trust. In administrating the trust, the trustee is held 
to a robust concept of fiduciary duties. In fact, the concept of fiduciary 
duties may be one of the defining aspects of the common law of trusts, and 
a rich and well-developed concept of fiduciary responsibilities and duties 
has developed under common law.176 
Particularly noteworthy, trusts are entities in themselves—separate and 
distinct from the parties surrounding their creation (i.e., the settlor, trustee 
and beneficiary). Because trusts are perceived as separate entities, they have 
unique partitioning and protection features.177 Trust law splits the trustee 
into distinct legal persons—an individual acting on her own behalf and a 
 
171. The settlor is the original property owner who transfers the property to establish the trusts. 
There may be one settlor or multiple settlors. The settlor may also be referred to as the “grantor” or 
“trustor.” 
172. As Scott’s treatise contemplates, “[t]he duties of the trustee are such as the [settlor] . . . may 
choose to impose; the interests of the beneficiaries are such as he may choose to confer upon them.” 1 
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1 (4th ed. 1987). 
173. Effectuating the settlor’s intent has been characterized as the foundational substantive 
principle of the laws of trusts. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, Essay, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2004); see also Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: 
Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 288–90 
(2010) (discussing the importance of intent effectuating default rules in trusts and estates law); Lee-ford 
Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of America’s Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 752–
53 (2014) [hereinafter Tritt, Trust Wars] (providing a brief overview of donative trust law and explaining 
settlor’s intent). 
174. Tritt, Trust Wars, supra note 173, at 752–53.  
175. Generally, the settlor’s intent will be ignored only in those rare cases where it violates public 
policy by encouraging illegal activities, immoral behavior, or capricious purposes, to name a few. Tritt, 
Trust Wars, supra note 173, at 753 n.47.  
176. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 
94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005) (discussing the importance of the social norms underlying fiduciary duties). 
177. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 438 (1998) (noting that the property law aspects of shielding 













trustee acting on behalf of the trust178—thereby insulating the trustee from 
creditors of the trust and protecting trust assets from creditors of the trustee. 
In addition, the settlor’s creditors generally cannot reach the trust assets. 
Accordingly, asset partitioning and creditor protection aspects of trusts are 
very important in their use.  
2. Trusts as Organizations 
The essence of trusts and how they operate makes them uniquely 
applicable for socially-conscious entrepreneurs.179 In order to fully 
comprehend how business trusts provide a superior alternative 
organizational form for sustainability purposes, a rudimentary analysis of 
the function of trusts is required. Despite its historical legacy, trust law 
appears to have neither a complete descriptive theory nor a complete 
normative theory, and a debate concerning the nature of trusts has 
developed. Scholars in this area have questioned whether trusts lie within 
property law, contract law, organizational law, or a combination of all 
three.180 Though this debate has raged on for over one hundred years, 
 
178. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155, at 416. 
179. Although trusts have been used for centuries and have a well-developed and established 
common law, the very nature, function, and form of trust law remains subject to increasingly heated 
debate. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155, at 416 (stating that trust law is grounded 
in organizational law); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625 (1995) (arguing that the law of trusts is rooted in contract law); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 844 (2001) (briefly discussing the 
ongoing debate as to whether trust law is a form of property law or contract law); Sitkoff, supra note 
145 (noting that trust law can be applied to an agency cost theory framework).  
180. Professor Sitkoff summarized the debate in this area: 
Early participants in this debate, which has been ongoing for over 100 years, include Frederic 
Maitland (who took a contractarian perspective), Austin Scott (who took a proprietary 
perspective), and Harlan Fiske Stone (who took a contractarian perspective). 
. . . On the “dialogue” between Maitland and Scott, see [John H.] Langbein, [The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,] 644–46 [(1995)] (collecting and describing 
their publications); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 
17 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1917). 
. . . For modern American manifestations, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the 
Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1196–97 & n.13 (1985); 
Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform 
Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of 
Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 244–46 (2002); Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and 
the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 
62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 546 n.22 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1178 & n.73 (1999); [Thomas W.] Merrill & [Henry E.] Smith, [The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773,] 844 n.248 [(2001)]; see also ELIAS 
CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, 
FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 454–56 (4th ed. 1999); JOEL C. DOBRIS 
ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 476–77 (2d ed. 2003); RICHARD POWELL, POWELL ON REAL 












Professors John Langbein, Henry Hansmann, Ugo Mattei, Reinier 
Kraakman, and Robert Sitkoff have recently infused this debate with a new 
level of economic sophistication which merits a more detailed 
exploration.181  
Many scholars predominantly view trust law as a branch of property 
law.182 For example, a trust has been defined as “a fiduciary relationship 
with respect to property.”183 At its core, a trust cannot be created unless there 
is a transfer of property.184  
While this property-based theory of trusts is the majority position,185 
many scholars have also argued trusts are based in contract, as it is evident 
that trust law also involves contractual relationships.186 For example, 
Professor Langbein opines that the typical three-party trust (settlor, trustee, 
and beneficiary) is a contractarian institution and that the laws of fiduciary 
administration are “overwhelmingly contractarian.”187 Rather than focusing 
on the transfer of property into a trust, Professor Langbein argues that the 
most distinguishing feature of a trust is the “trust deal that defines the 
powers and responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property.”188 He 
 
PROPERTY ¶ 513[3], at 41-141–50 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., rev. 2003); Gregory S. Alexander, 
The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914, 5 L[AW] & HIST. REV. 303, 
336–50 (1987). 
Sitkoff, supra note 145, at 627 & nn.19–20. Professors Hansmann and Mattei have also contributed to 
this debate. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 177, at 437 (“A clear understanding of the functions 
served by the law of trusts offers insight . . . into the functions of organizational law in general. The 
private trust is among the simplest of the forms of enterprise organization provided for in the law . . . .”). 
The most recent contribution to this debate is Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency 
Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579 (2011). 
181. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 177, at 437; sources cited supra note 179. 
182. Langbein, supra note 179, at 627. For detailed descriptions of the view of trust law as 
property law, see Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 767, 768 & n.7 (2000); Joshua Getzler, Legislative Incursions into Modern Trusts Doctrine in 
England: The Trustee Act 2000 and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 2 GLOBAL JURIST 
i, 6–14 (2002); see also ROBERT A. PEARCE & JOHN STEVENS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE 
OBLIGATIONS 87–108 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing trust law as property law). 
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
184. See id. §§ 2, 74.  
185. Tritt, supra note 180, at 2595 (noting how Professor Sitkoff has conceded that the clear 
majority position is that trust law is a form of property law).  
186. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States. A Basic Study of Its Special 
Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 135 (1998). For the contractarian view of trust law, see generally 
Langbein, supra note 179; Patrick Parkinson, Reconceptualising the Express Trust, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
657 (2002) (dealing with the Australian model). 
187. Langbein, supra note 179, at 628. 
188. Id. at 627. Professor Langbein also acknowledges that “[o]ur black letter law has resisted the 
insight that trusts are contracts,” by pointing to the Restatement of 1959, which declared that a trust is a 













asserts that trusts are contracts and that the relationship between the settlor 
and trustee is equivalent to a modern third-party-beneficiary contract.189 
While trusts were originally used as a device to transfer and gift property, 
the use of the modern-day trust has shifted. Today, many trusts are instead 
used as a “management regime for a portfolio of financial assets.”190 This 
shift has affected the rights and responsibilities of trustees when managing 
trust property. Under the contractarian view, it is asserted that most of the 
trustee’s powers and duties are equivalent to standard default terms in a 
contract, which can be altered or modified.191  
Following Professor Langbein’s work, Professor Sitkoff promotes an 
agency-cost model of trusts that focuses on the reduction of transaction 
costs between the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary.192 This view shares 
similarities with Friedman’s view of corporations, where the corporate 
directors are agents of the shareholders,193 although Professor Sitkoff 
focuses on donative trusts, where the settlor’s intent takes precedence over 
the beneficiaries’ desires.194 Professor Sitkoff’s theory, applied to business 
trusts, would likely be even closer to the corporate agency-cost theory. 
Professors Hansmann, Kraakman, and Mattei, however, make 
compelling arguments that trust law is grounded in organizational law, 
which, at its core, operates as a form of property law.195 Organizational law 
is comprised of the “bodies of law that govern standard legal entities.”196 
Examples of entities include general partnerships, corporations, private 
trusts, charitable trusts, municipal corporations, and marriages, just to name 
a few.197  
 
189. Id. at 627.  
190. Id. at 629.  
191. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 177, at 469. 
192. Tritt, supra note 180, at 2595; see also Sitkoff, supra note 145. To determine whether trust 
law is closer to contract or property law, Professor Sitkoff argues that agency cost principles derived 
from corporate law and economics can be applied to private trusts. Id. Professor Sitkoff focuses on two 
important aspects of trusts: separation of ownership and the relationship between the trustee, beneficiary, 
and settlor. Id. Ultimately, Professor Sitkoff asserts that principal-agent economics can offer helpful 
insights into the nature and function of trust law. Id. For a detailed discussion and analysis of why agency 
costs theory is incompatible to trust law, see Tritt, supra note 180. 
193. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text; see also Sitkoff, supra note 145, at 623 
(“[M]any of the analytical tools supplied by the agency cost theories of the firm, which are routinely 
applied in the economic analysis of corporate law, should be similarly applicable to the underdeveloped 
economic analysis of trust law.”). 
194. See Sitkoff, supra note 145, at 624. 
195. See Peter B. Oh, Business Trusts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 268, 279 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. 
Loewenstein eds., 2015) (“[T]he trust is grounded in property law.”).  
196. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 807, 807 (2000).  
197. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155, at 390. 












To begin, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman argue that “the essential 
role of all forms of organizational law is to provide for the creation of a 
pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’—that could not 
practicably be established otherwise.”198 An entity’s ability to shield assets 
from creditors is a derivative of property law rather than contract law.199 
“Without organizational law the firm could not be established as a juridical 
person that could hold title to assets in its own right.”200 Therefore, 
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman ultimately proffer that a trust’s ability 
to insulate assets from personal creditors makes it a legal entity and thus 
trust law is a form of organizational law.201 
To reach this conclusion, Professors Hansmann and Mattei focus on the 
economic functions served by a “separate law of trusts.”202 They seek to 
discover what the law of trusts can accomplish without relying on principles 
of contract and agency law.203 As mentioned above, trust law automatically 
imposes standard default rules, which govern the relationships between the 
settlor, trustee, and beneficiary and impose fiduciary duties on the trustee.204 
Professors Hansmann and Mattei concede that these rules can be modified 
or rearranged and thus the effect of the rules might also be achieved by 
contract in the absence of trust law.205 Furthermore, in the absence of trust 
law, agency law principles would apply and impose fiduciary duties on the 
trustee.206  
Given that basic principles of contract and agency law can cover the 
relationships between the trustee, settlor, and beneficiary, Professors 
Hansmann and Mattei argue that the “more vital function of trust law lies in 
arranging the expectations of the personal creditors of the Settlor, Trustee, 
and Beneficiary,” and that these relationships cannot be covered by contract 
or agency law.207 This vital function of trust law protects all three parties. 
For example, generally, under trust law, the settlor’s creditors cannot reach 
 
198. Id.  
199. Id. 
200. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 196, at 812–13 (“Organizational law eliminates the need 
for such contracting, and the transaction costs and moral hazard associated with it. By permitting the 
firm itself to be an ‘owner’ of assets, the law permits business assets to be insulated easily from claims 
of the individual creditors of the firm’s owners or managers. In this respect—and this is the crucial 
point—organizational law operates as a form of property law, permitting changes in rights that bind third 
parties.”). 
201. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155, at 416. 
202. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 186, at 133. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 136 (noting that these default terms govern the duties and powers of the trustee, such 
as the duty to preserve the trust property).  
205. Id.  
206. Id. at 136–37.  













the trust property if the settlor is not a beneficiary of the trust.208 The same 
holds true for the trustee: if the trustee becomes insolvent, the trustee’s 
personal creditors cannot go after the trust property that is administered by 
the trustee.209 Beneficiaries are also protected in the event that the trustee 
breaches her fiduciary duty by selling trust property to a third party who has 
notice of the trust and is not a bona fide purchaser.210 Professors Hansmann 
and Mattei therefore argue that in the absence of trust law, the relationships 
between the trustee, settlor, and beneficiary and third parties cannot be 
easily rearranged by contractual means due to the high transactional costs 
that would follow.211  
Professors Hansmann and Mattei conclude that the ordering of 
relationships between the trustee, settlor, beneficiary, and third parties who 
deal with the trust—relationships that cannot be rearranged easily by 
contract law—is the principal benefit of trust law.212 With this in mind, 
Professors Hansmann and Mattei look to whether “trust law provides 
benefits that are not provided by the law of corporations.”213 In doing so, 
they focus on how a trust has the ability to separate and partition assets from 
creditors—the essential function of organizational law.214 More specifically, 
“trust law provides for the creation of an entity—the trust—that is separate 
from the three principal parties.”215 As a result, trusts are organizations that 
are similar to corporations because they separate assets from creditors and 
offer limited liability to the trust’s beneficiaries.216 Therefore, the next 
question becomes: What can trusts do that corporations cannot? 
The principal difference between trusts and corporations is flexibility.217 
Trusts do not have to face many of the restrictions that corporations face, 
including restrictions by “even the more liberal business corporation 
 
208. Id. at 139.  
209. Id. at 140.  
210. Id. at 146.  
211. Id. at 147; see also id. at 144 (noting how the creation of a trust-like relationship between the 
settlor and trustee, where the settlor is free of personal liability, would be impractical for the trustee 
because if the trustee were an agent of the settlor, any contracts entered into by the trustee would bind 
the settlor as principal).  
212. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 177, at 434. 
213. Id.  
214. Id.  
215. Id. at 470. Professors Hansmann and Mattei also briefly discuss the agency theory of trusts. 
Id. at 472. They argue that this theory focuses on the shared intent of the three principal parties in a trust, 
which is in line with a contractarian view, but Professors Hansmann and Mattei take it a step further and 
focus on the arrangement of creditors’ rights. Id. It is this function of trust law, the reorganization of 
rights between third parties and creditors, which is the property-like aspect of a trust. See id.  
216. Id. at 438, 472. 
217. Id. at 472. 












statutes.”218 Professors Hansmann and Mattei list several restrictions 
specific to corporations, such as the requirements for a board of directors, 
annual shareholder meetings, and residual claims.219 Trust law allows for 
the “creation of an entity managed by persons who are not subject to direct 
control by the residual claimholders.”220 
These benefits have led to the rise of business trusts, which allow 
investors of capital to become beneficiaries of the trust.221 Professors 
Hansmann and Mattei note that there is still a need for statutes that provide 
for different types of business corporations, such as LLCs, because they 
provide more structure than business trusts.222 However, even with the 
additional rise of more liberal business corporation statutes, the business 
trust has remained popular in certain industries.223 All of the same functions 
provided by state corporate statutes can be achieved privately through the 
use of a business trust.224 
These intrinsic and unique aspects of trusts make them an organizational 
form that is more suited to sustainability purposes. The primary function of 
organizational law is to partition assets within an organization and “define 
the property rights over which participants in a firm can contract.”225 
Therefore, at its core, organizational law encompasses property law and 
allows organizations to shield assets and ensure limited liability226—a 
function that can be achieved through the use of private trusts and business 
trusts. It is evident that certain functions of trust law can be achieved using 
the basic tools of contract and agency law, but the more important function 
of a trust—its ability to insulate assets and offer limited liability—comes 
from organizational law. While similar to corporations in this way, trusts 
offer flexibility that corporations do not. Thus, trusts as an organizational 
form may be ideal for socially-conscious entrepreneurs, and business trusts 
are particularly suitable. 
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219. Id. at 472–73.  
220. Id. at 473.  
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225. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155, at 440. 













3. Business Trusts in the United States227 
Business Trusts have been around for more than one hundred years in 
the United States.228 Historically, business trusts offered profit-seeking 
associations of individuals limited liability, entity shielding, capital lock-in, 
tradable shares, and legal personhood.229 Business trusts enjoyed their 
heyday back when state laws made incorporation cumbersome and placed 
severe restrictions on corporations. Today, business trusts remain in 
common usage for the structuring of mutual funds and in asset 
securitization.230  
What is a business trust? Business trusts are unincorporated associations 
carried on for profit,231 created at common law by a trust agreement.232 The 
United States Supreme Court has defined a business trust as: 
[A]n arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in 
accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and 
managed for the benefit of such persons as may from time to time be 
the holders of transferable certificates issued by the trustees showing 
the shares into which the beneficial interest in the property is divided. 
These certificates, which resemble certificates for shares of stock in 
a corporation and are issued and transferred in like manner, entitle 
 
227. Although there are two types of trusts that fall within the commercial trust realm—the 
traditional commercial trust and the business trust—this Article focuses on the business trust. A 
traditional commercial trust, though, operates more like a gratuitous trust in that the traditional 
commercial trust’s main focus “is to collect, to preserve, and to distribute” the trust assets. See Thomas 
E. Plank, The Bankruptcy Trust as a Legal Person, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251, 256 (2000); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 172–82, 227 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (discussing laws 
relating to commercial trusts); Jared W. Speier, Comment, Clarifying the Business Trust in Bankruptcy: 
A Proposed Restatement Test, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1065, 1074 n.85 (2016) (discussing other characteristics 
of the traditional commercial trust, including “the appointment of a trustee by the beneficiaries of the 
trust; the power of the trustee to act on behalf of the beneficiaries, which includes suing and defending 
suits; and that the trustee does not have the broad power to conduct business activities”). 
228. See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment 
Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 424–28 (1988) (elucidating the origins and history of the 
Massachusetts business trust). 
229. John Morley, Essay, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-
American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2146 (2016). 
230. John H. Langbein, Essay, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 171–72 (1997). 
231. Speier, supra note 227, at 1074. 
232. Wheeler A. Rosenbalm, Comment, The Massachusetts Trust, 31 TENN. L. REV. 471, 471 
(1964). 












the holders to share ratably in the income of the property, and, upon 
termination of the trust, in the proceeds.233 
Generally, a business trust is created: 
[W]herever several persons transfer the legal title in property to 
trustees, with complete power of management in such trustees free 
from the control of the creators of the trust, and the trustees in their 
discretion pay over the profits of the enterprise to the creators of the 
trust or their successors in interest.234  
The business trust may be illustrated as follows: A, B and C desire to 
form a company in which to invest their money. They consider the 
plan of organization. They may form a partnership, or a corporation; 
but decide that they will pay certain amounts to [a Trustee] under a 
transfer whereby [the Trustee] will hold the funds in trust for A, B 
and C for purposes specified in the transfer, it being also provided 
that the interests of A, B and C are transferable upon the books of the 
[Trustee].235 
Business trusts evolved from private donative trusts and, accordingly, 
were historically governed under traditional common law principles of 
trusts. In many ways, business trusts are analogous to their ancestor, the 
private donative trust. First and foremost, business trusts may be viewed as 
the epitome of the settlor’s freedom.236 Business trusts allow entrepreneurs 
to design their organization any way they desire (subject to the pressures 
and judgments of the markets).237 Second, legal title of the trust property is 
transferred to the trustee in order to manage the property for the trust’s 
beneficiaries (usually through transferable certificates of beneficial 
interest). Third, the business trust agreement,238 which creates the trust, sets 
forth the specific details of the trust—such as its terms, the duties and 
powers of the trustee, and the precise interests of the beneficiaries.239 
Finally, the business trust is considered a distinct legal entity separate and 
 
233. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146–47 (1924).  
234. Goldwater v. Oltman, 292 P. 624, 627 (Cal. 1930). 
235. ALFRED W. BAYS, LAW OF CORPORATIONS WITH A CHAPTER ON BUSINESS TRUSTS 182–83 
(1921). 
236. Tamar Frankel, Essay, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 325 (2001). 
237. Id. at 325–26. 
238. Private donative trusts, however, may be oral as well as created by a written trust agreement. 













apart from the parties of the trust (i.e., the trustor, trustee, and 
beneficiary).240  
There are, however, distinct and legally significant differences between 
private donative trusts and business trusts.241 First, the settlor of a private 
donative trust receives no compensation for her conveyance of property into 
a trust, whereas the settlor of a business trust always receives payment for 
the assets conveyed to the trust.242 Second, the goals of business trusts are 
not to collect, preserve, and distribute trust property, but rather to use the 
property to conduct business and make a profit.243 Third, in a business trust, 
investors in effect pool their resources in a mutual, consensual, contract-like 
relationship, as between themselves and a trustee, while private trusts arise 
from the settlor’s gift with no contractual elements in its creation.244 Fourth, 
the business trust agreement “not only prescribes the assets of the trust, the 
duties and responsibilities of the trustee, and the rights of the beneficiaries; 
it also prescribes the permissible business activities of the trust.”245 Fifth, in 
contrast to most private donative trusts, the settlors of business trusts are 
usually the beneficiaries and are not third parties. The beneficiaries of 
business trusts require a measure of control over the trustee and voice in 
changing the trust instruments. Finally, business trusts are taxed as business 
entities, not as trusts.246 
 
240. See Plank, supra note 227, at 260; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-501(2) (2018) 
(providing that a statutory trust, which includes a business trust, shall be “a separate legal entity”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(g) (2018) (providing that a trust shall be a “separate legal entity”). 
241. In fact, the differences between the two types of trusts are so significant that one court stated 
that the “only resemblance [a business trust] bears to an ordinary trust is the fact that the word ‘trust’ 
happens to have been chosen as the generic term to describe” the commercial enterprise. Jim Walter 
Inv’rs v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (quoting Supplemental Brief in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Jim Walter Inv’rs, 401 F. Supp. 425 (No. C75-804A)). 
242. Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 
58 BUS. LAW. 559, 562 (2003). 
243. Speier, supra note 227, at 1074 & n.87 (citing GEORGE BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES: A TREATISE COVERING THE LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND ALLIED SUBJECTS 
AFFECTING TRUST CREATION AND ADMINISTRATION WITH FORMS §§ 2–7 (1984)) (“describing the 
means employed by a trustee in using the trust property to operate a business”); see also, e.g., Jim Walter 
Inv’rs, 401 F. Supp. at 428 (“Plaintiff's associational characteristics include: centralized control; 
beneficial shares; distinct legal existence provided by its declaration of trust; limitation upon liability; 
profit motivation; ability of the shareholders to remove the trustees with or without cause, to merger or 
terminate the trust, and to freely amend the terms of the trust instrument.”); Schwarcz, supra note 242, 
at 559–60 (discussing the profitable markets in which business trusts thrive). 
244. Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or Business 
Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704 § 2 (1978 & Supp. 2001) (discussing the differences between private trusts and 
business trusts). 
245. See Plank, supra note 227, at 258. 
246. See infra Section II.B.5 (discussing the taxation of U.S. business trusts). 












Because business trusts were associated with common law trust 
principles, business trusts posed a number of potential uncertainties.247 To 
avoid these uncertainties, many states in the United States passed statutes 
regulating business trusts. Like trust law, business trusts are creatures of 
state common and statutory laws. The rights and liabilities of any business 
trust are determined under the laws of the trust’s situs. Laws governing 
business trusts vary greatly depending on the state. The foremost statute 
regarding business trusts is the Delaware Statutory Trust Act of 1988.248 
4. Delaware 
The Delaware Statutory Trust Act of 1988249 facilitated the use of the 
business trust as a form of business organization by eliminating several 
disadvantages associated with common law trust principles. The “principle 
purpose of the Act is to recognize expressly the statutory trust as an 
alternative form of business association.”250 This Act requires that a 
business trust hold, manage, invest, or perform business or professional 
activities for profit.251 “[T]here are four general requirements in order to 
consider a trust a business trust: (1) there must be a trustee; (2) the trustee 
controls identifiable property; (3) the trust must engage in business; and (4) 
the trust must issue transferable shares.”252  
 
247. See Chermside, supra note 244, at 719–30. For example, the status of business trusts is not 
always clear. They are unincorporated associations that act like corporations and may be considered to 
have violated corporate laws if not properly registered. In addition, their standing to sue and be sued has 
been challenged in some jurisdictions. See id. 
248. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–24 (2018).  
249. Id. 
250. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.2 (3d ed. 2019). 
251. The provision in its entirety states: 
“Statutory trust” means an unincorporated association which: (1) Is created by a governing 
instrument under which property is or will be held, managed, administered, controlled, 
invested, reinvested and/or operated, or business or professional activities for profit are carried 
on or will be carried on, by a trustee or trustees or as otherwise provided in the governing 
instrument for the benefit of such person or persons as are or may become beneficial owners or 
as otherwise provided in the governing instrument, including but not limited to a trust of the 
type known at common law as a “business trust,” or “Massachusetts trust,” or a trust qualifying 
as a real estate investment trust under § 856 et seq. of the United States Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 [26 U.S.C. § 856 et seq.], as amended, or under any successor provision, or a trust 
qualifying as a real estate mortgage investment conduit under § 860D of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. § 860D], as amended, or under any successor 
provision; and (2) Files a certificate of trust pursuant to § 3810 of this title. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(g)(1)-(2). 













“The Act eliminates the requirement imposed by other states that the 
trust be engaged in the conduct of a trade or business or issue certificates or 
shares.”253 Any legal business, for-profit or not-for-profit, including 
commercial business, suffices.  
Common law trusts had several disadvantages that the Act eliminated. 
For example, the Act provides for the limited liability of both the beneficial 
owners and the trustees254 in that the Act clarifies that beneficial owners are 
“entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to stockholders 
of private corporations for profit” and that no personal liability can be 
imposed on a trustee unless provided by contract.255 Additionally, the Act 
contains highly permissive provisions, allowing the grantor and trustee a 
staggering degree of freedom to design their relationships with beneficiary-
investors. Specifically, the Act gives both grantor and trustee much leeway 
in the trust’s governing written instrument to define, as they see fit, their 
responsibilities, liabilities and how the trust is administered. The flexibility 
embodied in the definition of the “business trust” allows the parties forming 
the business trust to adopt such characteristics of traditional private 
gratuitous trusts, corporations, or partnerships as the parties may desire. 
Further, the critical areas of the beneficial owners’ and trustees’ rights in 
the trust property and the management of the trust, respectively, are all 
couched in permissive terms: “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in 
the governing instrument of [the business] trust.”256 This highlights the 
fundamental policies of freedom of contract and flexibility of Delaware’s 
business trust in that the Act emphasizes the freedom to write into or omit 
from the trust document almost anything. For example, the duties and 
liabilities of the trustee may be modified by the trust’s governing instrument 
and fiduciary duties “may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by 
provisions in the governing instrument” except the “implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”257 In essence, Delaware offers “a 
complete opt-out regime as to whether any kind of trust-based duties of care 
 
253. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 250 § 19.2. 
254. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(a). 
255. Id. § 3803; see also id. § 3817 (providing for trustee indemnification). 
256. Id. §§ 3805(e), 3806(a). 
257. Id. § 3806(c). 












or loyalty exist.”258 Simply, flexibility “may be the greatest advantage of the 
[business] trust over alternative forms of business organizations.”259 
5. Taxation 
An important factor in choosing a business form is taxation. Thus, any 
article that suggests the use of a specific business form must discuss how 
that form is taxed. The business trust’s flexibility does not end with its 
operation. Instead, when it comes to taxation, the business trust continues 
to be more flexible than the corporate form. 
The taxation of a U.S. trust depends on its purpose. If a trust “is created 
to protect or conserve trust property on behalf of trust beneficiaries,” like an 
ordinary donative trust, it will be taxed as a trust under Subchapter J.260 This 
means that trust income is generally taxed to the beneficiaries upon 
distribution.261 If the trust income is held by the trust for later distribution, 
it will be taxed to the trust until distribution.262 Upon that later distribution, 
it will be taxed to the beneficiaries and the trust will get a tax credit for the 
tax it previously paid on that income.263 
By contrast, if a trust has a “business purpose” and “associates,”264 as a 
true business trust would, it is not subject to traditional trust taxation.265 For 
tax purposes, business trusts are considered more of a business than a 
trust.266 In fact, Department of Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(b) 
defines a business trust as an entity that is not classified as a trust for 
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. One of the prerequisites for 
classification as a business trust is that the organization must have a business 
 
258. Oh, supra note 195, at 272. But see Frankel, supra note 236, at 332, 340 (asserting that despite 
the language of the Act, the Act could not eliminate all vestiges of fiduciary duties). 
259. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN , supra note 250 § 19.2. 
260. Carter G. Bishop, Forgotten Trust: A Check-the-Box Achilles’ Heel, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
529, 531–32, 554 (2010). 
261. Carter G. Bishop, Trusts, Taxes and Business: Dealing with ‘Check-the-Box’ Regulations, 




264. Id. A business trust will have a business purpose if the “trust instrument granted the trustee 
broad powers to conduct a business with trust property.” Id. A business trust has associates if the 
“beneficiaries [] share or influence the trustee’s duties under the trust.” Id. Bishop notes that to avoid 
having associates, a trust “should not be created by the beneficiaries . . . and . . . should specifically 
prohibit the beneficiaries from exercising any trustee powers.” Id.  
265. Bishop, supra note 260, at 554.  
266. Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935) (explaining that the object of the business 
trust is not to hold and conserve particular property, as in the traditional type of trusts, but to provide a 













purpose.267 In contrast, a trust generally does not have a business purpose 
or associates.268  
Instead, business trusts are subject to the check-the-box tax 
regulations.269 Under the check-the-box regulations, a business trust will be 
treated as either a disregarded entity or a partnership.270 If the business trust 
has one beneficiary, it will be treated as a disregarded entity, which means 
the business trust’s income will be taxed to the beneficiary under the 
individual income tax regime.271 If the business trust has more than one 
beneficiary, it will be treated as a partnership.272 The default for such a 
business trust under check-the-box regulations is to be taxed as a partnership 
under Subchapter K, but the regulations also allow it to elect to be taxed as 
a corporation under Subchapter C.273  
Generally, businesses perform fact-specific analyses to determine 
whether, given specific circumstances, corporate or partnership tax status is 
preferable.274 In conjunction with the default rules, the Internal Revenue 
Code and state statutes may dictate when business entities must be treated 
as corporations.275 Federal law mandates corporate tax treatment only in 
 
267. Id. at 352. 
268. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (2018). For purposes of determining whether a trust is an 
ordinary trust or a business trust, courts consider whether trust beneficiaries are “associates”: those who 
are beneficially interested in business operations and seek to share in advantages of a common enterprise, 
either by joining in business activities from the outset or by later participation in the business 
arrangements. Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344, at 356–57. Associates are beneficiaries; however, beneficiaries 
are not necessarily associates. See id. Therefore, where beneficiaries engage in business activities, the 
entity is generally considered a business trust. See Thrash Lease Tr. v. Comm’r, 99 F.2d 925, 928 (9th 
Cir. 1938).  
269. Bishop, supra note 260, at 554–55. 
270. Id. at 531. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in Business Tax Reform, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2013); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1–4 (check-the-box regulations). Prior 
to 1997, this was not the case. Bishop, supra note 260, at 533. The old regulations made it much more 
difficult to classify a business trust. While ordinary donative trusts were taxed under Subchapter J, 
business trusts proved more complicated. Id at 530. If a business trust more closely resembled a 
partnership, it would be taxed as a partnership. Id at 544. If a business trust resembled a corporation, it 
would be taxed as a corporation. Id. Thus, a business trust needed to be closely analyzed before it was 
clear which taxation regime it would fall under. The pre-1997 regulations incorporated the standards in 
Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344. Bishop, supra note 260, at 562. Morrissey articulated four corporate 
characteristics: centralized control, continuity, limited liability, and transferable certificates. Morrissey, 
296 U.S. at 360. Under the old regulations, if a business trust had at least three of these characteristics, 
it would be deemed a corporation. Bishop, supra note 260, at 562 & n.198. If it had less than three of 
these characteristics, it would be deemed a partnership. Id. 
274.  A discussion of the relative advantages of partnership and corporate tax treatment is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  
275.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2018). Under this section, the following entities must be 
treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes:  












limited circumstances, such as when a business entity is publicly traded.276 
If a business trust is publicly traded, then, it must be taxed as a 
corporation.277   
The Internal Revenue Code prevents business trusts from being taxed 
like ordinary trusts.278 Nonetheless, a for-profit entity will likely benefit 
from being taxed as a partnership or corporation rather than as an ordinary 
trust, especially if it plans to accumulate net income.279 As compared to 
partnerships, ordinary trusts are treated like individuals except they incur 
the maximum income tax rate significantly faster than individual 
partners.280 For 2018, the maximum individual income tax rate of 37% 
applies to ordinary trusts when undistributed net income exceeds $12,500; 
alternatively, married-filing-jointly taxpayers use the same rate only once 
taxable income exceeds $600,000.281 As compared to corporations, ordinary 
trusts pay higher tax rates on taxable income over $2,550.282 For 2018, an 
ordinary trust pays income taxes at a rate of 24%, 35% or 37% while 
corporations are subject to a flat tax rate of 21% on the same taxable 
income.283 Notably, the previous comparisons consider neither the effect of 
trust distributions nor double-taxation on corporate earnings. Still, the 
comparisons highlight why business trusts would likely prefer partnership 
or corporate tax treatment over ordinary trust treatment. Essentially, the fact 
 
“(1) [a] business entity organized under a Federal or State statute, or under a statute of a 
federally recognized Indian tribe, if the statute describes or refers to the entity as incorporated 
or as a corporation, body corporate, or body politic; (2) [a]n association (as determined under 
§ 301.7701-3); (3) [a] business entity organized under a State statute, if the statute describes or 
refers to the entity as a joint-stock company or joint-stock association; (4) [a]n insurance 
company; (5) [a] State-chartered business entity conducting banking activities, if any of its 
deposits are insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1811 et 
seq., or a similar federal statute; (6) [a] business entity wholly owned by a State or any political 
subdivision thereof, or a business entity wholly owned by a foreign government or any other 
entity described in § 1.892–2T;” and “(7) [a] business entity that is taxable as a corporation 
under a provision of the Internal Revenue Code.”  
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)–(7).  
276. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2018) (mandating corporate treatment for publicly traded business entities, 
including business trusts).  
277. Id.; GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 29, 14 (3d ed. 2016). 
278. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b). 
279. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661. Accumulated and undistributed net income is taxed at the ordinary trust 
level. Net income distributed to beneficiaries, however, is deducted from taxable income when 
calculating the ordinary trust’s tax liability. Beneficiaries who receive the distributed net income are 
responsible for reporting their share of the trust’s net income and paying the income taxes at their 
individual tax rates.  
280. I.R.C. §§ 1, 641(b). 
281. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
PUBLIC LAW 115–97, at 6 (Comm. Print 2018). 
282. Id.  













that a business trust is considered a trust for certain purposes does not 
provide a competitive advantage from a federal income tax perspective.284  
In addition to federal income tax considerations, those interested in 
forming a business trust must review state-specific tax consequences. Most 
states have enacted business trust statutes that provide default rules for 
determining whether a business trust shall be considered a partnership or 
corporation for state tax purposes.285 Federal income tax rules generally 
defer to state statutes regarding whether an entity must be considered a 
corporation.286 Note, however, if a business trust is classified as a 
corporation and it meets criteria for making an S-Corporation election, pass-
through taxation may still be available. 287 
In conclusion, a business trust has broad discretion under the Internal 
Revenue Code and regulations to classify itself as a partnership or 
corporation. Default classifications may be changed readily, with some 
limitations. Under no circumstances, however, will a business trust engaged 
in business operations be treated as an ordinary trust for tax purposes.288 
State-specific statutes may provide additional default rules, which should 
be reviewed prior to formation.  
 
III. BUSINESS TRUSTS AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM FOR SOCIALLY-
CONSCIOUS ENTREPRENEURS 
Business trusts provide an attractive alternative business construct—both 
positively and normatively—to efficiently effectuate the evolving model of 
business sustainability. Positively, business trusts offer a mechanism—a 
flexible and vetted organizational form—to implement sustainability 
measures without running afoul of the legal uncertainties associated with 
shareholder primacy. Normatively, business trusts provide a cohesive 
means of serving the true purposes of the sustainability movement while 
taking all stakeholders into account. Accordingly, the dual goals of seeking 
profits while being socially responsible can co-exist more organically 
 
284. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (2018).  
285.  State statutes may use the terms “commercial trusts” or entities organized under “common-
law declarations of trust” instead of “business trusts.” An analysis of various state-specific business trust 
statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.  
286. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b).  
287. See I.R.C. §§ 1361–62. A detailed discussion of a corporation’s S-corporation election is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
288. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a). 












within a trust structure than within a corporate structure that is constrained 
with burdensome common law doctrines and potential regulatory intrusion.  
Historically, business trusts were used as “a tool to circumvent strict 
incorporation statutes,”289 so using business trusts to circumvent overly-
restrictive corporate organizational and legal limitations should not seem 
like a novel concept. As early as the thirteenth century, business trusts were 
used to evade the primogeniture laws.290 Later, in the eighteenth century, 
they were used to avoid the strict authorization requirements for 
corporations in England.291 This use of trusts as a more flexible business 
form continued in America. In Massachusetts, the first state in which 
business trusts thrived, business trusts were used to avoid the state’s strict 
incorporation statute and the prohibition on dealing in real estate that was 
placed on corporations.292 This history shows that business trusts have 
always been used as an entity to avoid inflexible and problematic corporate 
organizational limitations and laws. In line with this history, business trusts 
can be used once again in order to avoid shareholder primacy’s restrictions 
on sustainability. 
In addition to the historic use of business trusts to circumvent corporate 
barriers, two other characteristics of the business trust make it a particularly 
attractive organizational alternative for socially-conscious entrepreneurs. 
These unique aspects of business trusts are relevant in seeking an 
organizational form that is more suitable for socially-conscious 
entrepreneurs because business trusts offer opportunities for innovation and 
flexibility that corporations do not. 
A. Structure 
The structure of business trusts is uniquely suited to sustainability. 
Business trusts are treated as entities independent from their settlors, 
trustees, and beneficiaries. Unlike corporations, where shareholders may be 
deemed to “own” the corporation, beneficiaries do not own the business 
trust. Unlike corporations, trustees are the “masters” of the business trusts. 
And unlike corporations, where executives and directors are deemed agents 
of the shareholders, trustees are not agents of the beneficiaries.293 These 
 
289. Speier, supra note 227, at 1066 (“Citizens seeking the benefits of a corporate structure were 
forced to create voluntary assications, such as business trusts, to avoid strict government oversight.”). 
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291. Id. at 1067–68. 
292. Oh, supra note 195, at 269–70. 
293. See Tritt, supra note 180, at 2602–06 for a discussion concerning why there is no principal-













differences are important. Agents are obliged to carry out the wishes of a 
principal, whereas a fiduciary’s obligation is to exercise independent 
judgement on behalf of the beneficiary’s interest in light of the purpose of 
the trust. Business trusts are independent entities whereby management’s 
authority comes from the trust agreement (and state law). In addition, 
business trusts permit a more expansive conception of a fiduciary duty, one 
that permits social responsibility and sustainability to be part of a trustee’s 
essential role in a way that might be problematic for corporations. With 
proper drafting, business trusts can be managed to serve business purposes 
as well as social and environmental purposes. A business trust may serve 
multiple purposes and serve many functions in business and society. 
This leads to a critical difference between corporations and business 
trusts: unlike the shareholders of a corporation, the beneficial owners of a 
business trust that is formed with the purpose of sustainability should not be 
able to sue the trustee for breach of its fiduciary duties because it practiced 
a sustainable management model. For business trusts, trustees need not 
adhere to so-called shareholder primacy models, shareholder wealth 
maximization norms, or agency-principle dynamics. Instead, trustees are 
primarily controlled by the governing instrument, which may require either 
shareholder primacy or sustainability if the drafter of the instrument so 
chooses. The flexibility business trusts offer allows the drafter of the 
governing instrument to tailor the liability of the trustee. Corporations do 
not have the freedom to draft out of shareholder primacy in this way.  
Additionally, entrepreneurs seeking the benefits of a corporate structure 
can create business trusts to avoid strict government oversight. One critical 
part of these business forms is the Board of Directors (Trustees). The 
selection process for a corporate board has changed substantially over the 
past decades. For instance, the corporate board selection process now 
involves: “(1) board selection by a nominating committee rather than the 
CEO; (2) more equity compensation for directors; and (3) more director 
control of board meetings through appointment of a lead director or outside 
chairman, annual CEO reviews, and regular sessions with outside directors 
only (‘executive sessions’).”294 This diffusion of power away from the CEO 
reduces the ability of a corporation to be driven by a sole leader.  
 
 
294. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s 
Right and What’s Wrong?, in U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 26, 36 (Donald H. Chew & Stuart L. 
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This structure contrasts 
with trustee leadership, 
which allows for sole 
direction and can be 
changed as needed. Further, 
regarding investment 
experimentation, it has 
been stated that controlling 
corporate governance 
further would be costly and 
inflexible.296 Demand for 
viable ways to circumvent 
this overstepped  
corporate governance will 
increase as technology 
continues to develop at an 
exponential rate and firms 
strain to keep up. This leaves 
the door wide open for newly 
formed organizations to use 
trusts as a practical and 




Figure 3297   
B. Flexibility 
The unique aspects of business trusts as an organizational form make it 
more suitable for sustainability-conscious entrepreneurs because business 
trusts offer opportunities for innovation and flexibility that corporations do 
 
295. This figure represents the structure of a corporation. The CEO directs the business strategy 
of the corporation, but the board of directors is nominated by a special nomination committee, not the 
CEO. The shareholders are the biggest organ of the corporation, and the directors and CEO have a duty 
to maximize profits for the shareholders. 
296. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 294, at 44. 
297. This figure represents the structure of a business trust. If structured in this way, the trustee is 
the biggest organ of the organization, which allows the trustee to control the social strategy while 













not. Under Delaware’s statutory trust act, most of the rules may be modified 
by the governing instrument,298 which provides a great deal of flexibility. 
For example, the act sets out the rules on liability of beneficial owners and 
trustees, “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in the governing 
instrument.”299 Additionally, the act allows the governing instrument to set 
forth the way in which the trust will be managed,300 thereby providing 
business trusts greater flexibility than corporations in management 
decision-making, including sustainability issues (in essence, keeping 
flexibility in terms of partnership by retaining the right to amend the 
contract that comprises the trust agreement while benefiting from treatment 
similar to a corporation). Simply, business trusts allow for increased 
flexibility through default rules that can be modified through drafting. This 
means that the trustee can have “more power over the trust property than 
the officers of a corporation have over a corporation.”301 
This kind of flexibility allows the drafter of the governing instrument of 
a Delaware business trust to direct the trustees to incorporate sustainability 
practices into the management of the trust. Unlike constituency statutes,302 
the social purposes are not constrained by state statute. The business trust 
can incorporate whatever social purpose it wants in its governing 
instrument. Unlike benefit and social-purpose corporations,303 this 
flexibility also allows the drafter of the governing instrument to make it 
simple for a business trust to change its social purpose. Additionally, rather 
than enumerating specific social purposes like a benefit or social-purpose 
corporation must,304 the business trust’s governing instrument could have a 
broad provision that allows the trustees to generally participate in 
sustainability practices. Businesses that will be able to be more forward-
looking, and bend-not-break when industry paradigm shifts happen in the 
market place, are less likely to cause harm to stakeholders. This flexibility 
is the primary reason business trusts are the ideal business form for socially-
 
298. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 (2018). 
299. Id. § 3803. 
300. Id. § 3806. The default management system is under the direction of the trustees, but this 
may be modified by the governing instrument. Id. § 3806(a). However, if the beneficial owners so 
choose, they can be responsible for the direction of the trustees. Id. 
301. Speier, supra note 227, at 1066. 
302. See supra Section I.C.1. 
303. See supra Section I.C.2. 
304. See supra Section I.C.2. 












conscious entrepreneurs looking to practice sustainability while avoiding 
liability.  
[Businesses] can prosper over the long term only if they’re able 
to learn, adapt, and regularly transform themselves. In some 
industries today, companies may need reinvention every five years to 
keep up with changes in markets, competition, or technology. 
Changes of this sort, already difficult, are made more so by the idea 
that management is about assigning individuals fixed decision rights, 
giving them clear goals, offering them incentives to achieve those 
goals, and then paying them (or not) depending on whether the goals 
are met.305 
Business trusts’ flexibility allows companies to do just that. 
Further, the flexibility of business trusts also allows the drafter of the 
governing instrument to decide how much power the trustee will have. The 
default rule is that the trustees direct the management of the company.306 
This rule, like most of the provisions of the Delaware business trust code, 
may be modified by the governing instrument. However, giving the trustee 
this kind of power is ideal for sustainability, because it allows the trustee to 
adapt their investment practices to the changing needs of society.  
Unlike a traditionally owned corporation, more thought can be put into 
the direction of the company. Further, this power allows for much more 
creativity and innovation within the business. Regardless of the company’s 
leadership or strategic ability, it allows a visionary to lead the company. 
Often, vision is lost and businesses which were formed to serve a social 
purpose become diluted and profit-driven. This amount of control allows 
for entrepreneurship and social good to remain at the center of an 
organization.  
The most obvious benefit of a business trust lies within its profit-based 
responsibilities. The Shareholder Primacy,307 CSR, and Sustainability308 
sections of this Article are at the heart of the shareholder versus stakeholder 
crux. For businesses to truly “do good” and properly plan for the future, a 
balance must be struck. When considering the formation and investment of 
a company, leadership is the piece that ties it all together. In order for the 
business trust schema to truly work, leadership’s hand must not be forced.  
 
305. Bower & Paine, supra note 22, at 58. 
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Although business trusts offer many benefits to socially-conscious 
entrepreneurs, there may be some drawbacks.309 These potential 
disadvantages aren’t legal or tax-oriented, but more pragmatic. These 
shortcomings arise from the grip of corporate governance structure, 
complacency within the business world and corporate legal culture, the fact 
that business trust case law is thinner than corporate law (which could lead 
to uncertainty and hesitancy), and the lack of knowledge of business trusts 
by important players such as banks and potential investors (particularly 
venture capitalists). Similar to the preference many investors expressed for 
investing in corporations over LLCs during LLCs’ nascent stages, investors 
may prefer to work with corporations over business trusts because of a 
general comfort level with the organizational form.310 In addition, because 
of business trusts’ limited governance requirements, outside investors may 
be wary.311 Yet, analogous to the evolution of the use of LLCs, pertinent 
players may become more familiar and comfortable with business trusts 
with their expanding use. 
Another disadvantage may be the misperception in the United States that 
business trusts cannot be used for large scale operating entities, but this is 
proved wrong by their use in certain foreign markets. In the United States, 
business trusts are largely ignored as profitable operating entities, and their 
use is mostly restricted to specific industries.312 In order to maintain viability 
in growing socially-conscious markets—both domestically and 
internationally—the American entrepreneurs will need to stay current with 
innovative, emerging economies. Upon revelation of the possible use of 
 
309. Advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of other stakeholders, such as 
management, unitholders, or society, are outside the scope of this Article. 
310.  See Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 
573, 574 (2016) (“Many legal advisors see the decision [between forming a corporation and an LLC] as 
a foregone conclusion, with the conventional wisdom offering that if you are seeking outside investment, 
form a corporation; if not, form an LLC.” (footnote omitted)); Richard Harroch, 10 Key Issues in Setting 
up an LLC, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2017, 9:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2017/01/18/10-
key-issues-in-setting-up-an-llc/#2c4058f1633d [https://perma.cc/994A-VT2C] (“Many investors, 
especially venture capital firms, prefer to invest in corporations and not LLCs.”). 
311. Andrew Stephenson, Seeking Outside Investors? Better Think About Converting Your LLC 
into a C Corp, CROWDCHECK (July 29, 2013), http://www.crowdcheck.com/ blog/seekingoutside-
investors-better-think-about-converting-your-llc-c-corp [https://perma.cc/N286-GN9Q] (“[O]utside 
investors are often wary of LLCs because of the limited corporate governance requirements. . . . [F]or 
an entrepreneur seeking outside investment, using a C corporation rather than an LLC has real 
advantages. . . . It may also be more appealing for outside investors to get a better picture of how the 
company is run and what their potential exit might be.”). 
312. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 38. It should be noted, though, that trusts are used as an 
organizational form by large not-for-profit organizations, so the idea that business trusts can be used 
successfully as large operating entities is not a radical concept. 












business trusts as an organizational form to pursue social purposes, a look 
abroad shed light on using business trusts as operating entities.313 As 
mentioned earlier, Singapore’s emerging economy is one of the best in the 
world,314 and it is known for being innovative and business-friendly. This 
emerging market is already taking advantage of this international use of 
business trusts. Amidst this booming economy, business trusts are 
becoming more popular on the Singapore Exchange.315 The success of 
Singapore business trusts on the Singapore Exchange shows that they can 
be effective as operating entities.  
Despite some pragmatic drawbacks, business trusts nevertheless offer 
many unique benefits for socially-conscious entrepreneurs. Therefore, the 
use of business trusts should be part of the overall discourse concerning how 
best to achieve sustainability in the business world.  
CONCLUSION  
The modern trend in business is to consider all stakeholders, not just 
shareholders. In the United States, companies are increasingly incorporating 
sustainability practices into their business management models. However, 
by practice and by law, shareholder wealth maximization norms conflict 
with the sustainably-conscious management model. Under this theory, 
shareholders may be able to sue the board of directors for breaching their 
perceived duty to maximize profits, which may occur if the board pursues 
sustainability. Some states have realized the shortcomings of the traditional 
corporate form and have enacted constituency statutes or created new 
corporate forms. However, these statutes and corporate forms have their 
own significant shortcomings.  
Despite many advantages, business trusts are not a popular operating 
entity within the United States. This may be due to the shareholder primacy 
paradigm, the effects of the stock market, or complacency within corporate 
legal culture. However, when compared to successful emerging economies 
that are taking divergent actions from the U.S. economic system, perhaps 
socially-conscious entrepreneurs should ask themselves why business trusts 
are not used as operating entities. 
 
313. For an in-depth comparison and analysis of business trust law in the United States and 
Singapore, see Tritt & Teschner, Rise of Business Trusts, supra note 20. 
314. See id. Many Americans may not have been aware of this fact until the popular film, Crazy 
Rich Asians, became a box office hit in 2018. This film portrayed just how successful some Singaporeans 
are. CRAZY RICH ASIANS (Warner Bros. 2018). 













Historically, business trusts have been used to circumvent overly-
restrictive corporate organizational and legal limitations. Entrepreneurs 
should once again look to this business form to provide flexibility to pursue 
sustainable measures while maintaining profitability. Due to the structure 
and flexibility of business trusts, they may be the ideal vehicle for 
sustainable businesses. 
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